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## VIETNAM REPORT

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## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### PHAM VAN DONG ADDRESSES MILITARY TECHNICAL INSTITUTE

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [PEOPLE'S ARMY REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 80 pp 24-28

[Speech by Pham Van Dong delivered "recently" at the Military Technical Institute: "Some Major Experiences of the Fight Against the Chinese aggressors and the Military Scientific-Technical Research Task in the Enterprise of Defending the Homeland"]

[Text] When introducing me, the Director of the Institute said that although I was busy I still arranged things so that I could come here to visit you. That is so. At present, you and I, as well as all our people and armed forces, are very busy. We are busily building and preparing so that we will always be prepared to fight and defeat the Chinese expansionists, if they foolhardily start another war of aggression against our country. Today I have also come here because of that "busyness," which is also to fulfill one of my duties. My desire and sentiment, which is shared by the other comrades leading our party and country, is that you, along with our entire army and population, will gloriously fulfill your difficult and noble responsibilities toward our homeland. On behalf of the Party Central Committee and the Government, I convey to you and your families the warmest sentiments.

Today I will speak to you about some major experiences of the recent victorious fight against the Chinese aggressors, the military scientific-technical research task, and the cultivation of cadres engaged in military scientific-technical research.

#### 1. Some major experiences of the fight against, and victory over, the Chinese aggressor troops (February and March 1979).

The all-round recapitulation of, and the isolation of major experiences regarding, the political, military, national defense, and combat aspects, and the experiences from the base and district levels to the provincial and military region levels, the experiences of a unit or a battle, etc., is primarily the responsibility of the comrades in charge of the armed forces.

They must pay much attention to experiences, and promptly recapitulate them, in order to continually improve our armed forces in all regards, as we are often admonished to do by comrade Le Duan and the other leadership cadres. It is not possible for me to work with you, but I am confident that, for the sake of future victories, you are entirely capable of, and will certainly succeed in, doing a good job of that recapitulation.

Today, in order to participate in your recapitulation, I want to discuss the major conclusions about our recent fight against the Chinese aggressor troops, and in the course of that refer to your work.

a. The first conclusion is that we are entirely capable of defeating the Chinese aggressor troops, and that it is not difficult to defeat them.

That is an extremely important matter, for we could only make that affirmation because we fought and defeated them. Our conclusion is truly clear and correct. Everyone knows that we only needed to use our on-the-spot forces to defeat 600,000 Chinese aggressor troops, and we defeated them on the front line! That was a very valuable experience, not only for us but for many other countries which are waging a life-or-death struggle against imperialism and Beijing expansionism.

b. The second conclusion is that the so-called "human wave" is nothing to fear. In the past, some people feared China's population of 900 million. But the Beijing reactionary clique could not mobilize the entire Chinese population for the war of aggression against our country. And it should be remembered that in the present era large armies are not necessarily strong: were not 600,000 Chinese aggressor troops heavily defeated? If we had more skilfully organized and had a higher degree of readiness that "human sea" would have been even more disastrously defeated!

C. The third conclusion is that at present our position and strength are stronger than ever. Let us look back at the time when Nguyen Hue fought the Qing troops in the 18th Century; when Le Loi and Nguyen Trai fought the Ming troops in the 15th Century; when Tran Quoc Tuan fought the Yuan troops in the 13th Century; and when Ly Thuong Kiet fought the Song troops in the 11th Century! During those periods our country was small and we had few people, while the aggressors had a large population and vast territory. Despite that, we were always the victors! Today we have a country that is united from north to south, and at our side there are the Soviet Union, Laos, Kampuchea, the other socialist countries, and all of progressive mankind. Although the Chinese expansionists have a big country and a large population they have been isolated in the world and are engaging in infighting in their own country. They are trying to form an alliance with the imperialists, but that "conubial" alliance has proved to be a "strange dream" which cannot result in any terrible strength. Therefore, in the comparison of forces between ourselves and the Chinese expansionists it is clear that we are stronger with regard to both position and strength. However, we must understand that our struggle against them will not be

easy and quick, although we will certainly win complete victory. That is a struggle by resolute warriors of true Marxism-Leninism and people of good will all over the world, people who clearly recognize the true nature of the reactionary clique within the Beijing ruling circles -- which opposes Marxism-Leninism, socialism, and communism, opposes the freedom of other countries, and sabotages peace. It is a struggle, in many forms, by the true revolutionaries and people of China against the treasonous, reactionary policies of the Beijing ruling circles, which are being applied on an increasingly broad scale. Truth and justice will triumph in the end. The inevitable developmental laws of history cannot be reversed. And only then can friendship between the Vietnamese and Chinese peoples be restored. For our part, we very clearly realize our responsibility in that glorious enterprise, which is certain to victorious.

## 2. On the military scientific-technical research task.

We continually follow your work and know about your constant and persistent efforts. Your accomplishments have made me and the other leadership comrades of our party and state very happy. But in order to continue to advance we must evaluate our work more fully, realize our good points and shortcomings more clearly, and reach conclusions in order to determine the direction of continued struggle. To carry out that work, the comrades in the Central Military Party Committee and the Ministry of National Defense will issue directives to you, but first of all you must evaluate your own work. You must have a comprehensive view, but must also focus on the key points. We must understand that no one person or organization, in any country cannot accomplish everything in a short period of time. That means that we must work with selected emphasis and concentrate our efforts on the central concerns, and not spread out our forces.

The same is true with regard to you; you must concentrate on meeting the immediate requirements of military science and technology, while also paying attention to the requirements of the next 5 to 10 years, and even the next 10 to 20 years. I believe that the problem that is now being posed for you is to research the maintenance, repair, and production of replacement parts for the weapons and technical equipment we are now using, while also researching the gradual manufacture of weapons and combat facilities that are appropriate to our way of fighting, in order to defeat the war of aggression of the Chinese reactionaries. If that is to be accomplished, we must first of all clearly understand the enemy. We must have data and information about their military potential, their strategy and tactics, their weapons and capabilities, and must make actual studies on the battlefield. As regards you, people who are engaged in technical military research, "readiness" means thinking and seeking, and to the maximum extent of your capabilities arm the three kinds of troops, and the armed forces branches and combat arms, with the best and most appropriate weapons and combat facilities so that they can annihilate the enemy, no matter what kinds of weapons they use, no matter what their fighting method, no matter on what scale, and no matter when they attack.

It must be understood that our people's present fight is a war to defend the homeland. The present war to defend the homeland differs from the liberation war during the recent undertaking of resisting the U.S. for national salvation. The nature of a war governs all matters: from strategy, tactics, and campaign guidance art to war-waging equipment. Therefore, it is very important that we fully understand the nature of war, and thereby more clearly realize the requirements of technical military research: what should be researched, what types of weapons should be produced, what should be done for our armed forces? It must be remembered that our armed forces are militia and self-defense units in the cooperatives, factories, wards, and schools, local units of the districts and provinces, and main-forces units, mobile corps, the armed forces branches and combat arms, etc.

To fulfill your missions well, you must manifest a spirit of collective mastership and manifest the intelligence and creative talent of the Institute's Cadre corps, while also studying the experiences of the comrades who have participated in combat. The Institute's cadres must study the actual situation on the battlefield in a planned manner, with clear objectives and requirements. The task of studying the actual situation must be appropriately organized and closely led, in order to serve the research work as effectively as possible.

I believe that gaining understanding of the enemy in order to defeat them is no simple matter. In the past, in the anti-U.S. war for national salvation, only after decades of fighting the enemy did we gain full understanding of them more rapidly, but we cannot be subjective or have light regard for the enemy. We must make all-out efforts to fully understand them, in order to realize at an early date all problems that are posed for our fight, and we must resolve them urgently but stably and gradually. The comrades in the Central Military Party Committee and the Ministry of National Defense will set specific requirements and guide you in fulfilling them. Therefore, I think that it is essential to strengthen the Institute's forces quantitatively and qualitatively. The comrades in charge of the Institute must think about that and make appropriate recommendations so that the upper-echelon leadership organs can have a basis on which to make calculations and decisions.

From the long-range point of view, we must develop our country into a rich and strong socialist country in this part of the world, into a country with modern industry and agriculture, advanced science and technology, strong national defense, and a civilized, happy way of life. We do not style ourselves heroes or hegemons, as the Beijing reactionaries do. On the contrary, our country has always been an objective of barbarous aggression by the Chinese feudal powers. The same is true today: in the face of the ugly plots of Beijing, our soldiers and people cannot lower their guard. Our Socialist Republic of Vietnam must have a strong national defense based on modern industry, on a prosperous socialist economy. In the recent anti-U.S. war, our soldiers and people were victorious because they manifested to a high degree revolutionary heroism, intelligence, and creative

talent, while also seeking the great, valuable support and assistance of the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries, and our friends all over the world. We produced little of our weapons and combat equipment. Today, in the fight against a new enemy, we are determined to continue to manifest a spirit of independence and autonomy, while also seeking the greatest possible amount of international aid. But in the long range we must gradually expand the production of weapons in order to equip our armed forces. The decisive matter is that there must be forces, and forces are made up of people. Our Vietnamese people and our Vietnamese nation have for generations demonstrated their capabilities and skills.

3. Regarding the cultivation of the corps of scientific-technical cadres.

As people who are engaged in military scientific-technical work, you must arm yourselves with the great thoughts of the people, of the party, and of Marxism-Leninism, and must have pure souls. You must endeavor with a spirit of "all for the enterprise of the nation and for our international obligations."

As are all cadres operating in the other spheres, the scientific-technical cadres are products of our society and system. We absolutely must not think that scientific-technical cadres are any different from everyone else. In the final analysis, if there is a difference it is merely that scientific-technical cadres love science more than others do.

If you are to be of much service and progress rapidly, you must study and help one another study. In life and in activity, we must support those who are skilled and oppose those who are jealous and harass people who are talented, and you must build wholesome sentiments toward your friends and with the collective. World science is now developing very rapidly, especially in the military sphere. Therefore, we must pay much more attention to scientific information, the window to a vast horizon, and be determined not to allow our knowledge to fall below the level of world science and technology. Your institute must have close relationships with the scientific-technical research forces and organizations of the other sectors; national defense and the economy must be integrated with each other, and there must be cooperation between military science and technology and the scientific-technical research of the other sectors. I hope that the Military Technical Institute will set a good example in sincere cooperation among the research organs inside and outside the army, with a spirit of "letting our friends have the easy part and taking the difficult part for ourselves."

Today, speaking to you is also speaking of the desires or, more accurately, the demands, of the party and state with regard to you, the Military Technical Institute, and our armed forces.

Can you meet the test? I believe that you can, and with flying colors.

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CSO: 4209

## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### STRENGTHENED MILITARY SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH URGED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [PEOPLE'S ARMY REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 80 pp 43-50

[Article by Senior General Hoang Van Thai: "Promote the Task of Recapitulating and Researching Military Scientific Research to Serve the Present Military Missions"]

[Text] The actualities of armed uprising and revolutionary war in our country during the past several decades, under the leadership of the party, have been extremely rich. Those actualities include both liberation war and war to defend the homeland. It is extremely important that we recapitulate those rich actualities and generalize them into theories, then use those theories to guide all military activities of our soldiers and people in the enterprise of defending and building the homeland.

During the past several years, under the correct leadership and guidance of the Central Military Party Committee and the Ministry of National Defense, and because we fully understood the situation and missions, firmly grasped the party's military line, and closely observed the developments on the battlefield and at the base level, despite limited forces, organization, and specialized professional training, those engaged in recapitulation, history writing, and military science research fulfilled a large number of principal missions, concentrated on resolving the urgent problems and a number of basic problems of 1979 and 1980, under the direction of the Central Military Party Committee, and contributed to serving the enterprise of defending the homeland and building and increasing the combat strength of the armed forces in the new situation.

We have achieved the initial systemization of the contents of the party's military line in the enterprise of defending the homeland, in order to have materials with which to educate the entire army. We must research and resolve many new developmental problems of military art regarding strategy, campaign art, and tactics, in order to be appropriate to the new situation and the new operational objective, and be appropriate to the conditions of our armed forces, which are undergoing new development with regard to organization and equipment.

The preparation of systems of internal, disciplinary, unit, sentry, and cantonment regulations; combat regulations; staff, political, rear services, and technical statutes; and instructional materials is being undertaken by the Ministry, the general departments, the armed forces branches and combat arms, the institutes and schools, etc.

The recapitulation of war experiences is being promoted. We have initially recapitulated the strategic problems of the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation, have promptly recapitulated the war to defend the homeland along the northern border, and are preparing to recapitulate the fighting in the southwest.

The organs of the Ministry and a number of units have begun the preparation of a history of the war, a history of the army, unit histories, a military geography, and a military technical dictionary.

With regard to the military science information task, we collected a large amount of material during the war and have promptly introduced foreign and domestic military documents, supplied information about the enemy's situation, and facilitated the research of new problems that are being posed.

By participating in the research, recapitulation and editing tasks, the military science research cadres have been cultivated with regard to both theory and methodology, and are producing more and more valuable scientific research.

However, there are still many deficiencies in our recapitulation and research. In many instances we have not promptly and fully met the requirements of the present military missions. The recent research projects have only just begun; they are not yet complete, and have certain theoretical and practical limitations. The recapitulation of war experiences and the preparation of histories have been carried out slowly and have not yet met the requirements of the task of researching, applying, and developing the experiences that have been recapitulated, in order to raise the level of guidance, organization and command, and theory of the cadres at the various levels, and increase the fighting strength of the armed forces.

The quality of research, recapitulation, and editing is not high and there is the phenomenon of perfectionism. There have been instances of failure to fully understand the party's viewpoint of combined strength, to firmly grasp the relationship between the military on the one hand and the political and economic on the other hand, or to keep abreast of the very new, very creative developments of the line of socialist revolution in our country, the economic line, and the military line in the period of building and defending the socialist homeland, which were set forth by the Fourth Party Congress and the resolutions of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Central Military Party Committee.

The reasons for those deficiencies are that we have had to concentrate on meeting the requirements of the combat and combat readiness missions, and that time is short but the requirements are very difficult and urgent. But other very important reasons are the lack of complete, unified, comprehensive, and profound understanding of the position and importance of recapitulation, history writing, and military science research in the new situation, and the fact that our abilities in those regards are still limited. Therefore, those tasks have not been carried out uniformly throughout the army; organization and cadres have not yet been stabilized; working methods are not yet good; work is done in a haphazard manner; and quality is still limited.

But in the actual construction process and activities of recent years we have accumulated practical experience, trained a number of cadres with definite professional ability and, especially, determined the correct direction for recapitulating war experiences and researching problems now being posed by the enterprise of defending the homeland. Recent recapitulation and research have resulted from just accumulation. Although those are only initial results, they have created a solid basis and new capabilities for the good fulfillment of the recapitulation, historical, and military science research tasks in 1980 and in future years.

At present, due to the nefarious plots and acts of the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists, in league with the imperialists, our country is in a situation of being at peace but threatened with the outbreak of war. Our people are endeavoring to build socialism but must also urgently prepare to fight to defend the homeland. The militant alliance with Laos and Kampuchea, and cooperation and friendship with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have undergone new development.

The new situation and missions are posing many new problems regarding the development and improvement of the combat strength of the armed forces, the consolidation of national defense, and the preparing and carrying out of war to defend the homeland. Those problems must be urgently studied. Therefore, new, very difficult requirements have been set for the recapitulation and research of military science; we must both urgently research the urgent problems and pay attention to recapitulating and researching the basic problems, in order to serve operational guidance and development in both the short term and the long term.

An extremely important matter is that our soldiers and people, just after winning victory in both wars to defend the homeland defeated two wars of aggression, one waged by lackeys of the Beijing reactionaries and one in which the Beijing reactionaries themselves invaded our country with their troops. The complete exposure of the enemy's reactionary nature caused our soldiers and people to become even more vigilant. And in the course of fighting we were even more capable of realizing the problems that were posed for the enterprise of defending our homeland.

Therefore, in research and recapitulation we must pay all-out attention to entering more deeply into illuminating the present problems, which the two recent wars to defend the homeland revealed to some extent. All-out attention must be paid to the experiences of our soldiers and people during the past several decades, and to the advanced experiences of the Soviet Union and the fraternal nations, while also paying all-out respect to the precious military heritage of our ancestors, to the rich knowledge and experience of our people over a period of thousands of years, in order to research the successful resolution of the present combat and development problems of our soldiers and people, and further developing Marxist-Leninist military science and art in our country, the military science and art of people's war to defend our socialist Vietnamese homeland.

In order to fully understand the direction and missions of the military science tasks for 1979 and 1980 that were set forth by the Central Military Party Committee, we must firmly grasp, and do a good job of implementing, the following principal contents regarding research, recapitulation, history writing, editing, and military science information.

First of all, with regard to research we must concentrate on resolving the theoretical and practical problems in order to serve the guidance of construction, increase the combat strength of the armed forces, consolidate and strengthen national defense, make the nation combat-ready, and victoriously wage war to defend the homeland.

Research must gain deeper understanding of the strategic plots of the enemy, and their capabilities and specific fighting methods, under the various circumstances and in the various areas, when they launch a war of aggression against our country from all directions. In studying the enemy we must consider them from all angles -- military, political, and economic -- and study the alliance among the various kinds of reactionaries, their weaknesses and strengths in the relationships and over-all effects of the revolutionary struggle in the region and on a global sphere, in both the short range and the long range, both the permanent basic problems and the temporary factors, etc. We must do a truly good job of applying our experiences in evaluating the U.S. imperialists in the past in order to evaluate the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, the common features of all aggressors as well as the separate features of that dangerous enemy.

We must study and apply the party's military line, war strategy, and military strategy in the enterprise of defending the socialist homeland, and the strategic operational formula, campaign art and tactics of the armed forces at a time when their organization and equipment are undergoing many changes so that they may be appropriate to an adversary which has a large army and shares a common border with us.

We must study our national defense, the task of preparing the nation to fight a war of aggression, the task of combining the economy with national defense, and planning for wartime mobilization. We must enter into actual

organization, guide activities, and contribute to assuring that the entire nation and each locality, and the entire army and each unit, truly has a high degree of combat readiness and fights skilfully in all regards, in order to be appropriate to the new situation, missions, and operational objective.

We must research the development of powerful people's armed forces and a revolutionary people's army that are increasingly professional and modern, that are prepared to fight and fight resolutely to defend the homeland, and that do production labor in order to contribute to economic construction and national development, fulfill their international duties, and become a large and attractive school for the young generations.

While undertaking research, we must continue to fully understand the line of holding high the banners of both national independence and socialism, and fully understand our party's viewpoints regarding the proletarian dictatorship and the collective mastership right of the working people, the three revolutions, the new regime, the new economy, the new culture, and the new socialist man, socialist industrialization, the construction of a modern industrial-agricultural economic structure, the central economy, and the local economy, and the task of combining the economy with national defense in our country. Only thereby can we fully realize the very great new capabilities of the enterprise of defending the homeland in the new era, and only thereby can we correctly resolve the military and war problems in order to win victory under all circumstances.

In addition to research, it is necessary to promote the recapitulation of war experiences, the compilation of military histories, and the compilation of a system of regulations, statutes, systems for the army, and educational materials, in order to meet the requirements of creating a national defense of all the people that is comprehensive, modern, and truly strong and building a professional, modern, elite people's army.

We must fully grasp the actual viewpoints, base ourselves on actual combat that has occurred and be of practical service to the present missions, and endeavor to complete recapitulations of strategic military guidance during the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation and the recent wars along the northern and southwestern borders, in order to contribute to guiding research and to resolving problems that have been recently posed.

On the basis of making recapitulations we must compile accurate and copious war histories, army histories, and unit histories that reflect the fine qualities and traditions of our army and people. And on the basis of the recapitulations, the actual conditions of our army and country, and the new requirements of war to defend the homeland, we must compile a complete set of combat regulations for the army, the armed forces branches, and the combat arms; disciplinary regulations, unit regulations, and cantonment and sentry regulations; and statutes regarding staff, political, rear services, and technical work.

We must compile a system of basic instructional materials for the institutions and schools that are truly appropriate to the requirements of combat and development in the new phase, are in accord with the regulations and statutes that have been promulgated, and are appropriate to the requirements of the transformation in education. At the same time, we must carry out the compilation of such essential materials as those regarding military geography, military economics, military psychology, military terminology, etc., in order to meet the requirement of increasing modern military knowledge in a basic, systematic manner.

We must promote military science information in order to serve recapitulation, history writing, and research, and guide the fulfillment of the present military missions. It is necessary to actively research documents; promptly introduce new developments in military science and art abroad and at home, especially developments in the socialist countries; step up the compilation of the necessary foreign materials; meet the requirements of research and compilation; and guide the activities of the armed forces branches and combat arms. We must continue to collect, register, and classify military science materials, and unify their management and use throughout the armed forces. It is necessary to gradually enable the military science information task to meet increasingly more difficult requirements, to be accurate, prompt, practical, rich, advanced, and both deep and broad, and to become a useful "dish" which is indispensable for cadres and corresponds to its important position in military science and art.

In order to do a good job of fulfilling the above-mentioned missions, we must further strengthen the leadership and guidance of the party committees and the military commanders; urgently perfect the military science organs at the various echelons; and pay attention to training a corps of cadres to do that work.

The party committees must issue resolutions and guide their implementation, while the military commanders must assign people to directly guide recapitulation, history writing, and military science research. Attention must be paid to combining military science recapitulation and research with the operational and training missions. As emphasized above, military science recapitulation and research have recently been beset with many deficiencies, to a very large degree because the party committees and military commanders at the various echelons have not paid adequate attention and have not given good guidance. At present there are an increasingly larger number of missions which are increasingly difficult, while our cadres' ability is still limited. We must work scientifically, with revolutionary science showing the way, and in accordance with objective laws. Therefore, military science recapitulation and research is even more important. They help us resolve many major, difficult new problems that are being posed, and to overcome a fierce contradiction among us -- the requirements of the missions being very difficult but our ability being limited -- and overcome working by trial-and-error, empiricism, conservatism, and arbitrariness. The party committees and military commanders must truly participate in this work,

avoid generalized guidance or assigning responsibility to specialized organs, via that work improve their abilities and those of the forces under them, and do a good job of fulfilling all missions.

We must further the setting up of Military Science Councils at the various echelons (general departments, military regions, armed forces branches, combat arms, institutes, schools, etc.), with specific functions, operational programs and plans, and regular activities, in order to strongly develop the collective intelligence, help the military commanders, research, guide compilation, contribute advisory opinions, and verify disseminate, and utilize the military science projects and topics that have been undertaken. We must perfect the organization of the military science organs at the various echelons, increase the number of cadres, stabilize organization, and establish responsibilities and work rules, in order to get military science activities onto the right track, in accordance with a centralized, unified guidance plan throughout the armed forces.

Especially, attention must be paid to training a corps of cadres to do military science research. That work must be integrally related to the army's long-range development plans, with foresight and a wide view, and the short range must be combined with the long range in order to have plans to train and use cadres. There must be appropriate regulations and policies to mobilise and encourage cadres to contribute to developing the armed forces and Vietnamese military science. In the immediate future we must bring the cadre forces up to full strength and select high-quality cadres who are experienced and are capable of doing theoretical research and compilation.

In addition to developing the capabilities of the cadres, organs, and units to contribute to the recapitulation, historical writing, and research tasks at the various echelons, there must be plans for using senior, experienced cadres in recapitulation and research, and for using retired cadres on contract. At the same time, attention must be paid to training a corps of young cadres to take over the work, and advance to specialised standardization, in accordance with military science regulations, standards, and functions that are appropriate to our army's actual situation at present.

In the process of carrying out the recapitulation, research, historical writing, editing, and military science information tasks, we must fully understand a number of guidance thoughts: combining those tasks with the fulfillment of missions, urgently concentrating on the key concerns and definitively completing each task. We absolutely must not separate the research, recapitulation, and compiling tasks from the fulfillment of the political and military missions of the army and the units. Indeed, we must by all means combine them closely with the fulfillment of missions, with regard to contents, plans, the utilization of forces, and implementation time. By fulfilling missions, we must control, and improve the quality of, those tasks.

Recapitulation, research, history writing, compilation, information, etc., have always been closely interrelated, and supplement and stimulate one another. Therefore, we must closely combine them, especially recapitulation and research. Research must be based to an important degree on recapitulation must contribute to the resolution of problems that are being researched.

We must firmly grasp our party's viewpoint that recapitulation, research, and the compilation and writing of history must be based on the actual conditions of our country and army. We must avoid both tendencies: ignoring the actual situation of Vietnam and thus being unrealistic and useless, or pretending to base ourselves on the "actual situation" but in fact being short-sighted and one-sided, which lead to empiricism.

At present, we have a very large number of missions, so it is even more important that we harmoniously combine the short-range with the long-range and the fundamental with the urgent, and avoid immersing ourselves in short-range concerns but forgetting the long-range ones, or concentrating on the long-range ones but neglecting the short-range ones.

Those tasks must be carried out urgently and rapidly, in order to ensure prompt service. We must resolutely concentrate on the key concerns, on the most essential, most important matters, without spreading ourselves out uniformly. We must complete all tasks we begin, achieve clear results, and avoid vacillation and failing to perform tasks neatly and rapidly.

The above are only some of the problems in guiding the tasks of recapitulation, research, history writing, the compilation of documents, and military science information at the present time. The promotion and good performance of those tasks is an objective demand, a heavy responsibility, and an important, permanent, important task. By fulfilling that task we can meet in a positive and practical manner the urgent demands of the great enterprise of consolidating national defense, developing our armed forces, maintaining combat readiness, and solidly defending our homeland, while also positively and practically improving the capabilities of all of us, so that we may be equal to the demands of the military missions in the new phase. At the same time, we must base ourselves on the actual situation, continually enable those tasks to advance, correctly, richly, and more effectively, in order to meet the increasingly difficult requirements of the military missions in the new situation.

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## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### ART OF SITUATIONAL COMMAND DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [PEOPLE'S ARMY REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 1980 pp 51-61

[Article by Lieutenant General Hoang Minh Thao: "The Art of Situational Command"]

[Text] Situational command is a very important matter in strategic guidance, campaign guidance, and combat. It requires the commander to have solid skills and to be resourcefull and creative. If strategic guidance, command guidance, and combat constitute an art, situational command is a very distinctive manifestation of that art.

In order to exercise good situational command, it is first of all necessary to clarify the meaning of "situation" and "situational command." "Situation" means a certain phenomenon, circumstance, or condition that occurs in the process of a war, a campaign, or a battle. Wars and battles are inevitably manifested in terms of situations, and take place by means of situations. Situations do not take place because of subjective desires, nor are they accidental. They take place in accordance with objective laws and result from the subjective efforts of the two opposing sides in war, in a specific place and during a specific time. They are the combined result of both force and position, and of many other elements, and are activities of two opposing forces which affect one another. They normally reflect in a concentrated and general manner the fierce, urgent conflict between those two forces; they either result in advantages and create the conditions for success or else create difficulties and lead to defeat. Their development has very important significance and effect, and at times determines the results of part or all of a battle, a campaign, or a war. Situations develop one after another before, during, and after battles. The most important and complicated situations are usually those that occur during battle, in many different forms. There are battle situations, campaign situations, and strategic situations. There are over-all situations and situations involving individual aspects, components, or echelon, which take place over a long period of time or in a brief period of time, take place in a large area or a small area, have varying degrees of ferocity or urgency and of easiness or difficulty, are created by the enemy, by us, or by natural conditions, are premeditated or unforeseen, etc.

"Situational command" is a process of carrying out plans and developing, guiding, limiting, selecting, dealing with, and countering the situation. It is the combined utilization of stratagems, battlefield positions, forces, and measures, first of all to change the balance of forces in a manner advantageous to us, create favorable battlefield positions and opportunities, organize the successful execution of the key, decisive blows at the decisive time and in the decisive places, assure the victorious implementation of the policies and goals that have been decided upon, and win total victory in battles, campaigns, conflicts, or wars. Situational command is a very important matter, a very difficult, lively, and complicated art within the art of strategic guidance and the art of commanding campaigns and battles.

Situational command amounts to more than reacting to a situation. If we merely sit and wait for a situation to occur we will be passive in dealing with it.

Skilled commanders must take the initiative in creating objective conditions for developing and guiding the situation so that it develops favorably for us and unfavorably for the enemy. Especially, they must create favorable situations for the key battles. If that is to be accomplished, there must be correct operational plans and goals and good stratagems, and we must be good at deploying formations, establishing battlefield positions, etc.

Operational plans delineate the objectives we must attain, the enemy forces we intend to annihilate, the places where we will annihilate them, the battlefields and areas we must take or occupy, the operational sequences of the units, etc.

The enemy troops we must annihilate in a campaign or battle are ordinarily the enemy's principal units in that campaign or battle. They are the enemy's key defensive forces, or their strong spearheads when they attack. The areas or battlefields in which we must annihilate them, or the areas and battlefields we must take and occupy, usually play a dominant role and include key positions which create the solidity of a defense or a strong assault force when they are on the offensive. If we annihilate the enemy troops in those places we will win a quick victory.

In order to carry out our intention of annihilating enemy troops at a place selected by us, we must employ stratagems. If we are to have good stratagems we must clearly understand the enemy troops, fully understand the terrain, and clearly understand our troops' capabilities and strong points.

To understand the enemy is to understand their intentions, capabilities, operational laws and schemes, strengths, weaknesses, and places of concentration and dispersion, and to understand even the personalities of the enemy commanders, etc.

Only by fully understanding the enemy and the terrain can we predict how and where they will react when we attack them, or how and where the enemy will attack when we are on the defensive.

Nor is it an easy matter to understand ourselves. Only by fully understanding our capabilities and combined strength can the commander take the initiative in commanding and in coping with the situation.

On the basis of accurate knowledge of the enemy, of the terrain, and of ourselves we must adopt stratagems for fighting the enemy. We must calculate and answer a whole series of questions. If we attack the enemy troops, can we annihilate and defeat them? To do so, how must we disperse the enemy troops? How must we deceive them? Where must we hold the enemy troops or interdict them? How should we stop the enemy and where should we fight the enemy reinforcements and counterattacks? Where should we fight the enemy attempting to circle around behind us, etc.?

In the General Offensive of the spring of 1975, our intention was to disperse the enemy in the Tay Nguyen region and liberate it first.

In the Border Campaign of 1950 our intention was to isolate the enemy in Cao Bang, draw in their reinforcements from Lang Son so that we could annihilate them, and then annihilate the rest of the enemy in Cao Bang, and liberate the border region.

In the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring Campaign our intention was to disperse the enemy to central Laos and pin the enemy down in the lowlands, in order to concentrate our forces on annihilating the enemy at Dien Bien Phu.

During the Tay Nguyen Campaign in the spring of 1975, we pinned the enemy down at Pleiku, cut Pleiku off from Buon Ma Thuot, cut off the enemy strong points in the Tay Nguyen area from their network in the coastal lowlands of Central Vietnam, and facilitated our attack on Buon Ma Thuot. Those were very lively demonstrations of our skill in creating a situation favorable to us and placing the enemy in an unfavorable situation.

After stratagems have been decided upon, the next step is to establish a battlefield position and deploy formations.

We establish battlefield positions in the overall battlefield position of people's war developed to a high degree. Therefore, our battlefield position is very lethal, strong, and flexible. We can fight the enemy in a comprehensive manner everywhere, both to the enemy's front and behind their lines, and with many rich, lively, and effective forms and styles.

In liberation war and war to defend the nation, our soldiers and people always fight the enemy by taking the initiative in offense, achieving mastery and attacking, attacking and achieving mastery, achieving mastery in order to annihilate the enemy, and annihilating the enemy in order to achieve mastery. Therefore, our battlefield position is one of tearing apart the enemy troops and beating them about the head, with extremely great strength which no enemy can shatter. In that over-all battlefield position of people's war we create a battlefield position that is advantageous for each campaign and battle, one that allows us to develop and guide the combat situations so that they are advantageous to us.

After we establish our battlefield position we enter into the fighting. As the fighting develops the battlefield position is brought into play and our stratagems are put into effect and developed. The combat developments result from the battlefield position (both forces and methods). The operations of the battlefield position give rise to situations. The development of situations is a struggle between two sides.

As the situation develops, contradictions in the struggle are resolved, and that process continues until all of them are resolved and the battle is concluded.

Whether a stratagem or battlefield position is good or bad can be determined only during the course of actual struggle, as the situation develops and changes.

The time when they are guiding and commanding a battle is the busiest, most creative time for a commander and the command organ.

To command a battle is to implement plans, adjust the battlefield position, utilize forces and measures or is, in other words, to guide the situation, deal with the situation, and countering the situation.

Whether commanders or command organs are skilled or not, is capable or not, and has mastered the art or not is demonstrated in a concentrated manner in their situational command.

As explained above, situational command is a process, a system of activities, of the commander, from his calculations and forecasts before the situation occurs to the selection of stratagems, the establishment of a battlefield position, the careful evaluation of our activities and the opposition by the enemy, as well as the enemy's activities and our method of coping with them, in order to develop and guide the situations, to manipulating an existing situation as if playing a game of chess.

In situational command, a very important and outstanding matter, one that amounts to an art, is guiding, limiting, selecting, and countering the situation.

That is an art of creating a favorable initial situation, an art of controlling the enemy forces, forcing them to fight on our terms, leading them into our battlefield position, and creating a situation that is in accord with our plans, so that we can annihilate the enemy.

In the Cong Tum Campaign in the Tay Nguyen region during the spring and summer of 1972, we lured two airborne brigades of the Saigon puppet army to a location northwest of Cong Tum City in order to annihilate them and pin them down there, thus creating favorable conditions for winning victory in the key Dac To-Tan Canh battle.

How were we able to draw the puppet paratroops out of Cong Tum City? Because we launched a skillful feint attack and lured the enemy to that area. We knew that the mobile main-force units of the puppet army were still cocky and subjective. Furthermore, the terrain in the area northwest of Cong Tum City is very important. If our troops undertook an action there at that time, it was certain that the enemy troops would have to come out. We moved into an area the enemy would have to save.

The initial situation of the Cong Tum Campaign of the spring and summer of 1972 was that the paratroops were drawn into the area northwest of Cong Tum City. The paratroops who were sent there were pinned down and annihilated, which created very favorable conditions for our troops to attack Dac To-Tan Canh.

In that situation, when our troops attacked Dac To-Tan Canh the enemy would have no, or very weak, reaction forces. Since the enemy had no reinforcements or reaction forces, our troops would be able to win an easy, quick victory. That is exactly what happened.

In campaigns and battles, situations occur in a very complicated manner. Some of the situations arise unexpectedly.

What can be done to assure that situations develop with few complications and more simply, and that there occur fewer unforeseen situations? That is a manner of limiting the situations (difficulties) and of selecting them.

In modern war, the armed forces of the two opposing sides have strong fire-power and a high degree of mobility, so situations develop very rapidly, unexpectedly, urgently, and complicatedly.

In order to reduce the complications, we must know how to limit and select the situation, develop the favorable situations, lessen the difficult situations, and prevent the enemy from acting freely and from being able to deal with us on their own terms.

We must predict and foresee what situations will occur, and how the enemy will react when we attack them. When we launch the first attack against a certain enemy unit or a certain place, how will the enemy react? When we launch a second attack against a certain enemy unit or a certain place, then how will the enemy have to react? In view of the enemy's way of reacting, what situations are the most difficult and dangerous for us, and are decisive in nature.

We must think about, foresee, predict, and determine the key situations, those that can change the course of a campaign or battle. We must make all-out efforts to limit the situations that cause major harm to our troops, either not allow them to occur or keep the difficulties to a minimum if they do occur.

In the Tay Nguyen Campaign of the spring of 1975, the most difficult situation for us created by enemy troops in the coastal lowlands of Qui Nhon and Nha Trang who were attempting to reinforce Play Cu and Buon Ma Thuot via Rt.19 and Rt.21. Those roads were also the enemy's road supply lines from the strategic rear area in the lowlands to the Tay Nguyen region.

In order to eliminate that situation, our troops used relatively strong and experienced forces to block Rt.19 and Rt.21.

When the campaign began, our troops completely mastered those two roads. The 22d Infantry Division, the Regional Force groups and the enemy's convoys had to accept humiliation and stop at the An Khe and Phuong Hoang passes to watch Play Cu and Buon Ma Thuot be surrounded.

We stopped that situation and smashed the enemy's plan reinforcement and resupply by road, which created very favorable conditions for our troops to victoriously attack the city of Buon Ma Thuot, and force the enemy troops to evacuate Play Cu and Cong Tum.

That was a matter of selecting, limiting, and eliminating the most dangerous situations.

The Chinese aggressor troops, with their "human sea" tactic, may also send many columns to cross the mountains and circle around behind us. But such columns are weak because they have no tanks, artillery, or motor vehicles. Supplies are brought in by foot, so those forces cannot fight for a long time and are not strong. We have many capabilities for defeating and eliminating those encircling columns. For in addition to our main-force troops we have a large number of local, militia, and self-defense troops who are very familiar with the terrain, are prepared in advance, and have operational plans. We won battles against the enemy's overland encircling columns at such places as Minh Tan Village and Hoang Tung Village in Gao Bang, and at Khanh Khe and Ma Duong in Lang Son.

To gain the initiative in combat it is necessary to control the situation and guide the initial situation so that it develops into succeeding situations that are advantageous to us and disadvantageous for the enemy.

In the Cong Tum Campaign in the Tay Nguyen region during the spring and summer of 1972, our troops initially lured elements of an enemy airborne division northwest of Cong Tum City in order to decimate its battalions one by one. The situation was guided to a second phase, in which our troops lured the enemy's 23d Division to Rt.14 between Cong Tum Play Cu and Cong Tum, and between Cong Tum and Tan Canh, in order to decimate it and pin it down. We successfully controlled the situation and created extremely favorable conditions for our troops to launch victorious, decisive blows against Dac To and Tan Canh.

In the process of controlling the situation, we must contest the situation. Contesting the situation amounts to a very urgent and fierce test of wits between ourselves and the enemy.

We can lead the enemy toward the situation we want to create, but they may not respond as we wish. In armed combat the two sides match wits and talents. Whichever side is more skilled will gain the initiative. It is not unusual for situations to develop in a way we had not foreseen. Even in situations we have created we must contest fiercely. In situations which do not develop as we desire, we must contest even more fiercely.

In the Dien Bien Phu campaign, the French set up a shield to the west in hopes of stopping our troops' offensive, and used an airstrip to resupply Dien Bien Phu. We simultaneously smashed that shield and interdicted the airstrip, and then took it, which left De Castries with the only alternative of raising a white flag and surrendering.

In the General Offensive and Uprising of the spring of 1975. We brilliantly coped with the strategic situation. We defend the two ends, Hue and Saigon, which allowed us to concentrate our forces in order to settle things in the Tay Nguyen region first. Under the direct guidance of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee, our troops used two groups of operational forces, which created favorable conditions for the forces in the Tay Nguyen region to launch the first attack. In this case we guided the strategic situation so that the enemy troops would be concentrated at the two ends and we could destroy their position in between. Thus we tied them down at the two ends, so that they would not have forces to reinforce and relieve the Tay Nguyen theater, and would not have forces that could be moved about from one battlefield to another. Strategically dispersing the enemy is the art of strategic deployment. It is an important principle in strategic guidance, especially when the enemy has a large army. If it is to be carried out successfully, we must have strong on-the-spot forces combined with mobile forces deployed in the most appropriate and advantageous manner.

When the Tay Nguyen offensive had all but been completed, the enemy had no mobile strategic reserves to send to that area so we launched strong attacks against Hue and Danang. That is an outstanding formula in the art of launching strategic attacks. When we liberated the Tay Nguyen region and the enemy had to carry out a strategic retreat, the strategic conflict gave rise to a new situation. We struck the enemy in a very vital spot, and brought about the collapse of their position, strength, psychology, and morale.

In that situation, our strategic response was to boldly change our intention. We changed from a strategic offensive into a general strategic offensive, and decided to liberate the South in one year instead of in two years. That is because we created, quickly realized, and resolutely took advantage of, that strategic opportunity.

When the second strategic blow, against Hue and Da Nang, succeeded, the strategic situation give rise to yet another move. That new move was the decision to liberate Saigon and all of the South before the onset of the 1975 rainy season, instead of by the end of 1975.

In order to carry out that new decision and our new move in the strategic situation, we had to strike a third strategic blow.

The third strategic blow, against Saigon, followed the other two, but not without an interruption. Therefore, we had to carry out buffeting operational activities by launching small campaigns and by combat action around Saigon, so that the enemy would not have time to recover, reorganize and readjust their forces, reposition their forces, or reorganize their defense.

Meanwhile, we were moving forces from the Tay Nguyen and Hue-Da Nang areas toward Saigon.

At that time, a major strategic opportunity was developing favorably. Our High Command decided to use its general strategic reserves. Our strategic guidance was much more skilled than that of the enemy with regard to using general strategic reserves.

With regard to organization, the Saigon puppet army had two strategic reserve divisions which had their own separate organization. Our army had only one general reserve corps which constituted one unit and was one tight organization.

With regard to utilization, the puppet army sent an airborne division, which was part of the general strategic reserves, to carry out the tactical mission of counterattacking and retaking Thuong Duc, a battalion-sized outpost. The enemy used a Marine division to defend Hue. That was a serious mistake with regard to the art of using general strategic reserves.

Our army concentrated a corps against strategically decisive objectives. Our general strategic reserves were used in correct accordance with their position and significance. Those forces, furthermore, were controlled by the High Command and were used very decisively; we could cope with any strategic situations we encountered.

The most decisive move was to send forces to strike a final, certain, war-deciding blow, in order to complete the general strategic offensive and bring the war to a victorious conclusion.

In that third strategic blow, our method of dealing with the strategic situation was to concentrate all our forces to overwhelm the enemy troops, including their general strategic forces, in order to launch a final decisive blow and conclude the war by rapidly smashing the enemy army and not allow it to gain breathing space and attempt to prolong or reverse things.

As we all know, in the first phase of the Cong Tum Campaign during the spring and summer of 1972 we did a good job of guiding and coping with the situation, so we were victorious at Dac To-Tan Canh. In the second phase we did not cope skilfully, so we were not victorious in Cong Tum City.

But in the Tay Nguyen Campaign in the spring of 1975 our army's ability to cope with the situation had clearly improved.

After cutting routes 19, 20, and 14 our troops attacked the district capital at Duc Lap and the city of Buon Ma Thuot.

We predicted that the enemy would land elements of the 231 Division by helicopter east of Buon Ma Thuot, on Rt.21, to counterattack and relieve Buon Ma Thuot and prevent our forces from advancing to Nha Trang.

On the basis of that prediction, we rapidly moved the 10th Division, which had just completed its attack against Duc Lap, to positions north of the city of Buon Ma Thuot.

When our troops took the city of Buon Ma Thuot, the enemy immediately sent elements of the 231 Division to relieve it, just as we had predicted. Our 10th Division was prepared for that situation. The two divisions clashed. In the end, our 10th Division eliminated the enemy's 231 Division.

That was a way of coping with the situation after we attacked Buon Ma Thuot. We had planned that move in advance. It developed favorably because prior to it we had been confronted with a very complicated development. Before we attacked Buon Ma Thuot, the enemy send the 45th Regiment of the 231 Division down to the area north of Buon Ma Thuot to search for and locate our forces. One of our divisions had to evade a battalion of the enemy's 45th Regiment in order to keep the objectives of our campaign secret. In order to draw the 45th Regiment back to Play Cu we sent elements of a division to launch strong attacks southwest of Play Cu City. Those attacks were very effective. The 45th Regiment of the enemy's 231 Division had to quickly return to Play Cu to cope with those attacks launched by our forces. Our response to that complicated situation was successful.

The third development in that campaign was the situation created when the enemy troops fled from Play Cu and Cong Tum along Rt.7. We had not foreseen that development. But we were able to cope with it successfully because we had good battlefield position and were very mobile.

Our 320th Division was deployed at a very pivotal position -- along Rt.14 between Play Cu and Buon Ma Thuot. From that point the 320th Division could attack Buon Ma Thuot, Play Cu, Cheo Reo, Rt.7 or Rt.21.

Since it was in such a pivotal position, when the enemy forces fled Play Cu along Rt.7 the 320th Division could quickly move to Rt.7 and cut them off.

During the war fought against the Chinese aggressor troops in our country's northern border region in the spring of 1979, our forces foresaw that they would have to engage the enemy in fierce fighting in the area of the Khanh Khe-Van Quan bridge on Rt.1B. Since they foresaw that fighting, our forces were able to put up a stubborn resistance and defeat the enemy attacks.

against Khanh Khe from Dong Dang. Not able to break through our front, the enemy troops had to circle around in the direction of Khanh Khe. Knowing that that "boomerang" column was very powerful, our army promptly sent forces to defeat the enemy at Khanh Khe and smash that threat.

On the Cao Bang battlefield we predicted that the enemy troops would attack the town of Nguyen Binh and advance to occupy the Tinh Tue mine. Our army promptly moved both border defense forces and local forces to help the militia of Minh Tan Village blunt that attack and defend Nguyen Binh and Tinh Tue. The militia of Minh Tan Village achieved great merit in wearing down, annihilating, contesting, and pinning down the enemy, and thus creating conditions for the other forces to coordinate in annihilating the enemy.

We guide and maneuver the situation to create a favorable opportunity, especially an opportunity to fight a key, decisive battle. That is the principal content, requirement, and objective of situational command.

If there is no key battle in a campaign, victory cannot be won. If a key battle is to be fought, it is necessary to create an opportunity. An opportunity results from struggle between the two sides to resolve the situation. An opportunity is a favorable situation that has developed to the point of ripeness, and is a contradiction that has developed to the point that it must be resolved.

To win victory in a key battle is to open a lock in order to resolve contradictions, and bring about a transformation in the situation.

When the opportunity of key battle presents itself we have attained an important part of situational command. But the over-all scheme has still not been carried out. Situational command continues to develop and guide the situation in order to create a favorable new situation and to meticulously ensure conditions for achieving victory in the key battle, to win a rapid, resounding victory. The greater our victory in the key battle, the more rapidly and more favorably will the campaign develop. If victory is won in the key battle, the campaign will undergo a qualitative change.

When we are able to draw the enemy's mobile forces out of their bases and out of the towns and cities, and then decimate them and pin them down, we have an opportunity to attack their strongpoints and bases.

In some cases we are able to draw out the enemy's mobile forces, but are not yet able to attack their bases and strongpoints. We must then continue to guide the situation, continue to create opportunities, and cause them to become even riper. We may organise another attack. Such an attack may be intended to cut a road to cut off and completely isolate the strongpoints from which the enemy intends to launch attacks. Therefore, when our troops attack the enemy is not capable of counterattacking and reinforcing. Once there are no forces to counterattack or reinforce, the enemy that are attacked will rapidly be wiped out or will surrender.

In the situation of fighting the enemy outside their fortifications, by continuing to guide the situation and continuing to create opportunities we can draw the enemy farther from their bases and cause them to become completely isolated. Their fixed fire support bases cannot give effective support, their tanks can operate only with difficulty, or else the terrain may be rough, we can more easily annihilate enemy reinforcements, etc.

Situations occur in a myriad of ways. The commander must be very flexible and creative when commanding, controlling, and guiding the situation, and when creating opportunities. Situations give rise to other situations, and opportunities give rise to other opportunities.

If a situation is helped to further develop in that manner there will be an even better opportunity and it will be even easier to win victory.

Our nation's history of opposition to foreign aggression has passed on countless valuable experiences regarding the command of and reaction to the situation. For example, faced with the situation of reinforcements sent by the Ming, Le Loi and Nguyen Trai concentrated on annihilating the army of Liu Sheng, which created conditions for forcing the surrender of Wang Tong. In combination with the military blow, Le Loi and Nguyen Trai struck a "political-diplomatic" blow to victoriously conclude the war. In a letter to Wang Tong, who was surrounded at Dong Quan, Nguyen Trai wrote,

"Let me remind you that there are six reasons why you must be defeated:

"The flood is overflowing, the walls are collapsing, you lack provisions, your horses are dying, and your troops are ill. That is the first reason why you will be defeated.

"In the past, Tang Tai Zong captured Jian Te and Shi Chong surrendered. Now there are troops and elephants defending the strategic passes. If reinforcements are sent they are certain to be defeated. Once the reinforcements are defeated, you are certain to be defeated. That is the second reason why you will be defeated.

"In your country all the strong military forces and good horses are stationed in the north to defend against the Yuan troops, and are not concerned with the south. That is the third reason why you will be defeated.

"When people are always at war and have to fight continually, they are unhappy and disillusioned. That is the fourth reason why you will be defeated.

"Dishonest officials have taken over, a weak king sits on the throne, throne; brothers kill one another and there is conflict within families. That is the fifth reason why you will be defeated.

"Now we have raised a force of patriots which is united from top and bottom and is extremely heroic. Our troops are steadily growing stronger and are

have increasingly better weapons. The both farm the fields and fight the enemy. You troops within the walls are all exhausted and are resigned to defeat. That is the sixth reason why you will be defeated."

Although that letter by Nguyen Trai was very brief it was very moving and incisive, and contributed importantly to creating a situation in which Wang Tong had to concede defeat and ask permission to withdraw his troops. We won complete victory without having to concentrate our forces to launch a fierce attack against the Dong Quan citadel.

Rereading that prose not only helps us with regard to Nguyen Trai's viewpoints and methods of examining and resolving situations, but also helps us realize our great strength and ability to win inevitable victory under the new conditions, under any circumstances, if the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists foolhardily invade our country.

Situational command is very important and has a key, decisive significance in operational (tactical, campaign, or strategic) command. It is a broad, difficult, complicated matter that passes through many phases, such as predicting, developing, guiding, limiting, selecting, reacting to, and coping with the situation. It includes many tasks that must be performed, such as grasping the situation, predicting the situation, making decisions, deciding on stratagems, establishing a battlefield position, organizing and using forces, taking steps to resolve each situation in order to win victory, etc.

Each step, each task, as well as the entire process of situational command demands of the commander very strong will and ability. In order to fully understand the party line and the intention of the upper echelon, under the direct leadership of the party committees, the commanders must have correct standpoints, a brave and stubborn combat will, scientific viewpoints and investigatory methods, and good organizational skill. In all situations, no matter how difficult, the commander must master the situation, take the initiative, be calm, dare take responsibility, be decisive and resolute, be active, creative, quick, urgent, circumspect, certain and stable, adhere to principles but be flexible, firmly grasp the necessary military art, tactics, and techniques, carefully organize and develop to the maximum the combined strength of all the organs, units, forces, etc. Therefore, the commander must continually improve his skill, his command ability, and his command art.

The commander must know how to recapitulate and generalize his own experiences, and study the many combat experiences of the wars and battles in our country and in the world, of today and yesterday, in order to continually improve their command ability and their situational command art.

By cultivating strong situational command skill -- about which we have presented only a few initial experiences -- operational command will easily win victories.

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## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### ACTIVITIES OF HAIPHONG ARMED FORCES REPORTED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Jun 80 p 1

[Article by Pham Duc Dai, Correspondent: "Following the Example of Dinh Trong Lich, the Haiphong Armed Forces Have Trained Well and They Have Strict Discipline and High Combat Readiness"]

[Text] The armed forces of Haiphong municipality have opened a study campaign on the brave example in protecting socialist property of war hero Dinh Trong Lich. The units working at Haiphong Port are determined to labor with high productivity, resolutely struggle against bad behavior and the theft of state commodities, oppose negative phenomena with great effect, have high combat readiness and fight excellently. The wonderful way of life, passion for study and willingness to train of war hero Dinh Trong Lich is further strengthening the cadres and soldiers of the units in Group 50, M79, M80, the T4 anti-aircraft unit and the B48 artillery unit and at the military academies at the determined to win training fields. The units have made much progress in carrying out the combat readiness procedures and orders and satisfactorily carrying out 11 procedures during the day.

Companies 9 and 12 of the 62nd Battalion, Group N66, had poor discipline in 1979 but they have now become good units. In May 1980, the 18th battalion of the border defense forces promptly discovered and arrested 70 people stealing socialist property. While loading and unloading commodities at the port, the 61st Battalion of Group N66 quickly discovered and detained a group of ~~thieves~~ who were working in collusion with the owners of the goods and recovered seven bags of cement and five bags of flour for the state. Studying intelligently and creating the spirit of heroism and sacrifice of Dinh Trong Lich in protecting socialist property, Private First Class Nguyen Van Thao and Private Bui Van Bai of Group N67, Private First Class Vu Van Trac of

the 61st Battalion, Group N66, Sergeant Vu Van Van of Group B71 and Private First Class Le Van Thang and Sergeant Dang Dinh Hong of the 18th Battalion, border defense forces, have improved their spirit of collective mastery and their revolutionary quality, refused bribes, promptly detained the dishonest people and recovered commodities valued at tens of thousands of dong for the state.

At present, the Haiphong Armed Forces are actively promoting the training emulation movement, following the example of war hero Dinh Trong Lich and "following his lead" in every operation and in every work sphere in order to complete the tasks in an outstanding way, have high combat readiness and, together with the public security forces, maintain political security and social order and successfully hit the five targets of the movement to "manifest the good nature and increase the combat strength" of the people's armed forces in 1980.

11943  
CSO: 4209

## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### ARMY'S ROLE IN SAFEGUARDING PUBLIC PROPERTY DISCUSSED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Jun 80 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Safeguarding Public Property"]

[Text] In defending the fatherland and building socialism, an important problem for us is to safeguard public and socialist property.

Socialist property, from machines, rockets and vehicles to a barrel of oil and a bag of rice, is the sweat and blood of the people; it has a direct effect on the revolution that the entire party and all the people and soldiers are carrying on and it affects the present life of society and the future of the country.

The army is one of the hard-core forces for defending and building the country and it is a very important force in safeguarding socialist property.

If socialist property is encroached upon, it means that the fruits of the revolution, the combat strength of the army and people and our lives are encroached upon too. One of the insidious methods of enemies, both outside and inside, is to destroy our socialist property. Assisting them are the hoodlums, dishonest merchants, speculators who hoard goods, people who engage in corruption, thieves and all the other bad people and negative elements in society. Aiming the spearhead of the offensive at these destructive elements and struggling resolutely against acts that encroach upon socialist property is a violent and complex revolutionary struggle and it requires every cadre and soldier to have a lofty spirit of collective mastery, brave and resolute combat will power, bright revolutionary quality, a lofty concept of organization discipline and strong operational capabilities.

Not only must we satisfactorily safeguard the property of the army, maintain it well, use it for long periods and exploit the effectiveness of the equipment and materials as much as possible in combat training and work, we must also actively contribute to safeguarding the property of the state and the people. If they see socialist property being encroached upon, regardless of what form this takes and regardless of whether it is done openly or secretly, the cadres and soldiers must certainly not remain indifferent, be lenient or walk away from this. No act of these people can shake our determination. They cannot offer any amount of money that will tempt us. Using every way possible, coordinating bravery with vigilance and intelligence and uniting closely with the people's public security forces and the people, we are resolved to safeguard socialist property, stop the destructive groups and force them to face the harsh punishment of the law.

The act in which war hero Dinh Trong Lich, a comrade and glorious comrade-in-arms of ours, sacrificed his life in order to protect socialist property at Haiphong Port is a brilliant example for our cadres and soldiers to follow.

Very many units and many cadres and soldiers have upheld the fine revolutionary quality of the people's army in safeguarding public property and they are trusted and loved by the people.

Studying Dinh Trong Lich and upholding the spirit of collective mastery and the quality of a soldier who was "loyal to the country and filial to the people," we regard safeguarding public property and attacking the destructive elements and those who steal socialist property as a combat task.

On this front, just as on the other revolutionary struggle fronts, our people's army is determined to always be worthy of the slogan "a soldier of grandfather Ho."

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CSO: 4209

## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### HAIPHONG BUILDS ISLAND, COASTAL DEFENSE AGGLOMERATIONS

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 24 Jun 80 p 1

[Article by Pham Duc Dai, correspondent: "Haiphong Promotes Building Villages and Coastal and Island Combat Agglomerations"]

[Text] In order to build up each district and ward so they become strong military fortresses, the Haiphong Military Command recently concentrated on guiding the districts and wards in continuing to promote planting bamboo around the combat hamlets at the key villages and agglomerations and at the coastal and island villages and agglomerations. At the same time, it solidified the building of militia and self-defense forces and closely coordinated the economic and national defense tasks.

After sending key leading cadres to visit and study the district fortress building experiences in Xuan Thuy district in Ha Nam Ninh Province and Tien Hai district in Thai Binh Province, the district and ward standing committees of Haiphong held a conference and issued a resolution on leading and promoting this work, making suitable use of things in the real situation in their localities, mobilizing all forces and capabilities, quickly completing the planting of the bamboo and building strong combat defense lines without disrupting the other tasks. The district and ward military committees have sent hundreds of cadres to strengthen inspections and supervision and to help the primary organizations organize forces in accord with the new requirements, especially with the plan to plant bamboo around the combat hamlets. Tien Lang, Vinh Bao, Kien An, Thuy Nguyen, An Hai, Cat Hai and Do Son districts have established committees to guide the planting of the bamboo. The committees are composed of the chairmen of the people's committees, the commanders of the military

organizations and a number of other key leaders. Each cooperative has established a unit composed of elderly soldiers and a number of healthy militia soldiers in order to select seed, transport bamboo, organize the planting and make plans to look after the bamboo after it has been planted.

Because of the firm leadership and guidance of the party committee echelons, authorities, sectors, mass organizations, people and local armed forces and because of having manifested their common strength, in the recent campaign, Haiphong municipality mobilized tens of thousands of man-days and planted hundreds of thousands of bamboo groves along the village, coastal and island combat defense lines.

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CSO: 4209

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

BRIEFS

HO CHI MINH CITY PEOPLE'S POLICE--The people's police force in Ho Chi Minh City recently met to review its emulation drive to maintain security for the fatherland over the first 6 months of 1980, and to adopt measures to carry out a political drive to build strong public security forces in the new situation. During this period, the city people's police force had organized 12 short-term military training courses for its 1,500 officers and noncommissioned officers. [BK241559 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 19 Jul 80 BK]

CSO: 4209

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

VCP MESSAGE TO SYRIAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 1 Jun 80 pp 1, 4

[Text] The VCP Central Committee has sent to the Fifth Congress of the Syrian Communist Party the following message of congratulations:

Best wishes for a most successful fifth congress of your Party.

We firmly believe that your congress will make an important contribution to the strengthening of the Syrian Progressive National Front; to promoting the struggle of the working class and of the Syrian people to liberate Syrian and Arab land occupied by Israel; to strongly supporting the Palestinian people's fight for national rights, including the right to establish a separate state on their own territory; to opposing imperialism and zionism led by U.S. imperialism; and to resisting the American-Egyptian Camp David Accords and the betrayal of the reactionary influence in the Egyptian ruling circles vis-a-vis the liberation task of the Arab people.

We affirm the Vietnamese people's unwavering solidarity with the just struggle of the Communist Party, of the democratic and progressive factions and of the whole Syrian people for liberation, national independence and social progress.

We sincerely thank the Communist Party, the progressive forces and the fraternal people of Syria for their wholehearted support of the Vietnamese people in their previous fight against the Americans as well as in their building of socialism and defense of their fatherland against the expansionist and hegemonist Chinese, who are conniving with U.S. imperialism.

May the solidarity and fraternal friendship between the parties and peoples of Vietnam and Syria be strengthened and developed more each day.

9458  
CSO: 4209

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

BRIEFS

HO CHI MINH CITY EXPORTS—Hanoi, 19 Jul--In the first 6 months of this year, Ho Chi Minh City transferred to the state a volume of export goods worth 43.7 million dong, an increase of 11.3 percent compared with the same period last year. Besides continuing to fill orders for industrial goods such as knitwear, clothes, woolen carpets, leather and rubber goods, bicycles, and furniture, workshops in the city are making new products including jute bags, wooden toys, tools, processed vegetables, frozen food, and pharmaceutical products. [OW221701 Hanoi VNA in English 1620 GMT 19 Jul 80 OW]

CSO: 4220

## PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

### FIRST PHASE OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP CARD ISSUANCE REVIEWED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 7 Jun 80 p 1

[Text] Party committees of provinces, cities and municipalities subordinate to the central echelon have been actively conducting the issuance of membership cards to party members of the 19 May phase. Prior to the start of this new phase, provinces, cities and districts had held meetings to learn from the experience of the issuance of membership cards to party members of the 3 February phase. The first phase was successfully concluded with over 160,000 members issued cards. Through examination and classification, many party organizations had over 80 percent of their party members qualified to receive cards. In the 3 February phase, many party chapters and party organizations resolutely deferred the issuance of party cards to those members whose combat will has fallen, to those of low quality and to violators of party discipline and expelled from the party degenerate and decadent individuals and those lacking qualifications for a party member.

Although it has been carried out only in a number of basic-level party installations, the 3 February phase has heightened the spirit of responsibility, the combat will, organizational consciousness, discipline and the total revolutionary spirit of party members. Deferred party members, having clearly recognized their shortcomings, tended to make efforts to earnestly fulfill party member duties; party bases moved one step forward in consolidation; party chapter activities have been put into a routine and have realistic contents; party organizations have tighter management over party members; relationships between party members and the people have been strengthened and harmonized. Many party chapters and party organizations which previously had lost the people's confidence because of their shortcomings now have corrected their mistakes and regained it.

Owing to lessons learned from the first phase of membership card issuance, issuance of membership cards in the 19 May phase has progressed smoothly and its quality was assured. This time, provinces, cities and districts selected those party organizations and party chapters that had been consolidated and those with fair improvement in their performance of political duties of the area and of their own units to take turns in organizing card issuance. Those party organizations and chapters that have

completed their consolidation tasks first will organize membership card issuance first in May or June....

This membership card issuance has benefited from attentive leadership by party committee echelons from the link of attending to the necessary procedures to that of the evaluation and classification of party members. Coordination between the three departments (organization, control and propaganda and training) in order to examine party members has been close. The Dong Nai provincial party committee has dispatched many cadres right to party organizations and chapters to control each component of the card issuance task and to promptly correct deviations and mistakes. The provincial and district party committees of Ha Tuyen province determinedly prevented any party members lacking the qualifications of a party member and those of low quality from receiving membership cards. After each step of the work, all district party committees in the province held meetings to share experience in order to succeed in the work of the next step. The Ha Nam Ninh provincial party committee set up 82 control teams at 344 basic-level party units to conduct card issuance and, after inspection, decided to defer eight branches that had completed procedures in order to make further consolidation. The Son La provincial party committee also resolutely deferred four basic-level units that had completed procedures but where most of the party members did not yet meet qualifications. Before starting this new phase of membership card issuance, the Quang NAM-DA NANG provincial party committee had required its basic-level units to re-study Directive number 72 of the Secretariat of the party Central Committee, which promoted criticism and self-criticism and, therefore, the accurate examination of party members.

In this phase of membership card issuance, party committee echelons have closely coordinated their work with the implementation of Directive number 81 of the Secretariat of the party Central Committee concerning the fighting of passive phenomena in society. Party committees resolutely declined card issuance to those party members who did not have a resolute attitude to protect the lines and policies of the party and state and who did not dare fight for the protection of truth and the revolution. Party members committing serious shortcomings concerning corruption, theft and oppression of the people, were deferred to later card issuance phases or were immediately expelled from the party. As of now, the Central Committee Organization Department has sent to provinces and cities over 426,000 party membership cards to be distributed in this 19 May phase.

9458

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## PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

### ARMY PARTY ORGANIZATION INCREASES MEMBERSHIP

HANOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 16 Jun 80 p 1

[Article: "The Army Party Organization Closely Links the Issuance of Party Membership Cards to Its Political Task; 50,000 New Party Members Are Inducted"]

[Text] During the 3 February and 19 May phases of activity, more than 32 percent of the basic party organizations and 28 percent of party chapters, which account for roughly 30 percent of the total number of party members within the army, issued party membership cards.

Many party organizations have given their attention to closely linking the issuance of party membership cards to the effort to build and strengthen installations and correcting organizational weaknesses while closely linking party activities and political work to the performance of the unit's task. Both during and after the issuance of party membership cards, the overall situation underwent a change for the better. In the 26th Regiment (the Air Defense Branch), the number of mistakes in orderly duty has significantly declined. The units on the frontline have closely linked the issuance of party membership cards to their number one task of maintaining combat readiness.

The examination and determination of the qualifications of party members have been carried out in exact accordance with established principles, procedures and methods, thereby insuring that all party members who are issued cards are fully qualified. Through this evaluation, the sense of responsibility, the vanguard-exemplary role and the spirit of serving the masses have been further heightened. Negative phenomena have been harshly criticized and repudiated.

Successfully organizing the masses in contributing their opinions concerning the qualifications of party members has had the effect of tightening the relationship between the masses and party members and giving them a better understanding of one another; party members are more concerned with caring

for the life of the masses. Many units once used to have the practice of having the masses criticize party members once every 3 or 6 months; during the issuance of party membership cards, the masses expressed their opinions in a more constructive spirit. In the majority of units, at least 85 percent of the persons outside the party have been taught and have contributed their opinions concerning the qualifications of party members. Coordinating the issuance of cards with the development of the party, the various units have accepted 50,000 new members into the party. However, this figure is still low compared to the plan. Some units did not induct one new party member during the entire 1st quarter of 1980. The various party organizations within the army have adopted a plan for correcting this shortcoming in order to bring many more outstanding persons into the party.

7809  
C30: 4209

## PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

### CARDS ISSUED TO SELECTED VCP MEMBERS IN HA BAC PROVINCE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 27 Jun 80 p 1

Article: "Ha Bac Issues Membership Cards in Consolidated Party Installations, Ousts Degraded and Deviant Members"

Text Twice on 3 February and 19 May, the party organization of Ha Bac Province issued party membership cards to more than 25,000 members in 635 party installations. Those who were qualified to receive cards on 3 February and on 19 May accounted for 16 and 29.3 percent, respectively, of the total number of members in the party organization.

The Provincial VCP Committee assumed direct control in 21 installations; the district VCP committees organized many control groups to work in the installations that had issued membership cards on 3 February and in the ones that were getting prepared to issue cards on 19 May. Except for four installations where the cards-issuing job did not bring about very positive results, all installations underwent many good changes. All party chapters maintained good activities. Party solidarity was strengthened; the people's collective ownership right was further developed. The production task and obligations toward national construction and defense and social security were fulfilled quite satisfactorily. Party members were assigned positive tasks, with control and supervision by the party committee echelons; many negative phenomena were repelled. The wrongly seized land was returned; debts contracted by cooperatives were paid off. Many party members who had not been issued cards on 3 February later received theirs after they had corrected their shortcomings.

The Provincial VCP Standing Committee and district VCP committees assumed tight leadership over the issuing of membership cards, which were issued only in the consolidated party installations, with those degraded and deviant party members being ousted from the party before the issuing of cards. The district VCP standing committee closely examined the classification of party members in every installation. On 19 May, 20 village party organizations and 30 party chapters which had planned to issue membership cards were told to wait for further consolidation. After verification, Tan Yen District VCP Committee told two of the five villages which had planned to issue membership cards to wait.

To obtain better results in their cards-issuing job, Tan Yen District VCP Committee advised all party installations to continue building and consolidating themselves to become really strong, to maintain discipline in party activities, to make management of members an orderly task, to further improve the quality of party chapter activities, to strengthen critics and self-critics within the party and to seek the people's opinions about party construction. All party organizations also were to verify the qualifications of members in terms of good fulfillment of political tasks, implementation of policies, fulfillment of all obligations toward the country and maintaining of good relations with the people.

5598  
CSO: 4209

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

BRIEFS

NGHIA BINH PARTY MEMBERSHIP--Nghia Binh Province has issued membership cards to nearly 89 percent of the party members from 449 grassroots-level party organizations during the 3 February and 9 May phases. These party organizations have recruited more than 1,000 new members. [BK241559 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 19 Jul 80 BK]

CSO: 4209

## ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

### INDUSTRIAL, COMMERCIAL TAX POLICIES DISCUSSED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Jun 80 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "The Industrial and Commercial Tax Policy"]

[Text] In the initial stage of changing over from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production, the policies and positions of the party and state are to exploit all of society's production capabilities in order to produce more and more products and expand services in order to satisfy the needs concerning the living conditions of the people and the requirements of building and defending the country. On one hand, an effort must be made to build state-operated economic production installations to serve as the guiding force in the national economy and, on the other hand, the production and business enterprise capabilities among the people must be exploited, expansion must be encouraged in accord with what is beneficial for the national welfare and the people's livelihood, negative phenomena and harmful actions must be stopped and limited, things must gradually be transformed in accord with socialism and socialist production relationships must be built.

In industrial and commercial operations, the collective and private sectors play a very important role. With the abundant labor forces and the capabilities, technology, skills and sources of capital presently existing among the people, the industrial, artisan and handicraft industry, transportation and building sectors, the service and food and beverage sectors and the small merchants in the collective and private economic sectors can exploit the arable land, the resources and the raw materials on the spot to produce products and expand services in order to contribute to satisfying the requirements of production, life and exports since the state economic sector cannot shoulder all of them. However, along with the positive aspects beneficial for the national economy,

concerning collective and private industrial and commercial operations, because people do not fully see the common interests of the entire country and of each large region and because they do not see the long-term interests, in collective and private industrial and commercial operations there are still elements who make a living illegally and who engage in speculation and smuggling, destructive groups and negative aspects that are harmful to production, the lives of the people and security and social order.

The requirements for state management and control are to see the great capabilities of collective and private industry and commerce, have plans and measures to guide and help exploit the capabilities, produce products of greater and greater use value, stimulate a proper expansion of production and business activities and, at the same time, stop and limit the negative aspects.

The industrial and commercial taxes are tools used by the state to guide, manage and control the collective and private industrial and commercial activities. The industrial and commercial tax policies are state laws that were promulgated after the completion of socialist transformation in northern Vietnam and after the liberation of southern Vietnam. They have had a positive effect in stimulating production, expanding services, contributing to supporting commodity circulation, managing the markets and properly mobilizing the contributions of the industrial and commercial systems. Because of not understanding the policies concerning collective and private industrial and commercial operations and concerning industrial and commercial taxes, very limited results have been achieved in carrying on state management and control and in ensuring sources of income for the budget. Insufficient tax collections and loose market management are still serious problems.

Facing the new situation and tasks, in order to strongly manifest the effects of the industrial and commercial tax policies and contribute to carrying on state management and control for industrial and commercial operations in the collective and private sectors, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly promulgated the order of 23 June 1980 which revised and supplemented a number of points concerning the industrial and commercial tax policies and the butcher's tax. The business income tax exemption of artisan and handicraft industry producers was raised so that it is in line with the average wage level of same-sector state enterprise workers. And following this, that of the people who are engaged in food and

beverage and commercial support business activities was also raised. Excess quota income taxes were abolished and income tax tables were promulgated part by part. The added-on tax for private producers was reduced from 25 percent to 5 or 10 percent or to no added-on tax. A temporary business tax rate was added and the butcher's tax was changed in accord with the guided purchase price of the state. The above revisions and editions have enabled the entire tax policy to be in accord with the new situation and put people's minds at ease so they can expand production and business operations in accord with the state's management principles and procedures and fulfill their tax obligations.

The industrial and commercial tax policies are a manifestation of the comprehensive policies of the party and state for collective and private industry and commerce.

Correctly carrying out the tax policies, manifesting the effect of using taxes to contribute to stimulating an expansion of production, expanding business enterprise activities in accord with the guidelines and tasks in the state plans, participating in market management, struggling to stop and limit negative phenomena harmful to the national welfare and the people's livelihood and so on are the tasks of the authorities at all levels and of all the sectors concerned, among which the financial sector has an important position.

The aim of the policies and positions of the party and state in general and of the industrial and commercial tax policies in particular is to ensure the long-term and legitimate interests of the laboring people. In order to ensure that the policies are carried out, the policies must be explained and propaganda must be spread widely among the cadres and people. Each person must be enabled to understand the state's policies and positions and they must self-consciously fulfill their obligations, carry out the state's management principles and procedures and participate in the struggle against people who make a living illegally.

All countries must levy taxes. The tax policies will differ depending on the nature of the system. The tax policies of our system are for the interests of defending the fatherland, for socialism and for the laboring people.

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CSO: 4209

## ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

### PREMIER'S OFFICE ISSUES DIRECTIVE ON TAX EXEMPTIONS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Jun 80 pp 1, 4

[Directive No 202/TTg from the Office of the Premier: "Office of the Premier Issues Directive to Guide the Implementation of the 23 June 1980 Order"; directive issued 25 June 1980]

[Text] In order to manifest the effect of the industrial and commercial tax policies, stimulate an expansion of production, expand business operations in accord with the economic lines and policies and planned guidelines of the state and implement fair and rational contributions between the primary organizations and the collective and private industrial and commercial business enterprise sectors, on 23 June 1980 the Standing Committee of the National Assembly issued an order revising and supplementing a number of points in the commercial and industrial tax statute promulgated in accord with Resolution No 200 NQ/TVQH on 18 January 1966 and the butcher's tax [statute] promulgated in accord with Resolution No 489 NQ/QHK4 on 26 September 1974.

To implement the above order of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, the Office of the Premier has put forward the following specific points:

1. Concerning the business income tax exemption rate for collective and private industrial and commercial production installations:

In order to ensure that the business income tax exemption rates are in accord with the new situation and to ensure a rational relationship between the sectors and between the collective, private and state economic sectors, the order of 23 June 1980 from the Standing Committee of the National Assembly has put forward the following specific stipulations:

"The exemption rate for the artisan and handicraft industry production sector, the transportation sector, the construction sector and the agricultural business enterprise sectors that are not in the agricultural tax category is equal to the average level of the basic wage of same-sector state enterprise workers in the locality."

"The exemption rate for the service and food and beverage sectors is 10 percent lower than that for the artisan and handicraft industry production sector."

"The exemption rate for the commercial sector is 20 percent lower than that for the artisan and handicraft production sector."

In accord with the above principles for calculating the exemption rate and in accord with the guidance of the minister of finance, the provincial and municipal people's committees and the people's committees of the special zones subordinate to the central echelon, the average basic wage of each state sector -- industry, construction, transportation and so on -- in the localities must be used as the basis for determining specific exemption rates for same-sector business enterprise producers subordinate to the collective and private economic sectors. The exemption rates for the artisan and handicraft industry production sector must be used as the basis for determining exemption rates more than 10 percent lower for the service and food and beverage sectors and more than 20 percent lower for the commercial sector. In determining the exemption rates, it must be ensured that there is uniformity throughout the country concerning principles, a rational relationship must be maintained between the localities in accord with the situation in each locality and a distinction must be made between the sectors that must be stimulated and those that do not need to be stimulated.

When changes are made concerning wages in the state economic sector, the minister of finance must provide specific guidance concerning adjusting the exemption rates for the production and business enterprise sectors in the collective and private sectors.

2. Concerning the use of business income tax tables for individual families engaged in artisan and handicraft industry production, transportation, construction and agricultural business activities (not in the agricultural tax category):

In order to encourage individual producers and businessmen to gradually become involved in the collective way of life, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly has decided to change Article 22 of the industrial and commercial statute as follows: "The business income tax for individual families engaged in artisan and handicraft industry production, transportation, construction and agricultural business activities not in the agricultural tax category is to be calculated based on the taxable income of the entire family in accord with the tax tables stipulated in Article 16; an additional 5 or 10 percent of the amount of the tax calculated is then to be added on. Sectors that do not have to be included in the collective production organization do not have to pay the added tax."

This additional 10 percent is for use in sectors and in places where needed and where producers and businessmen can be involved in the collective way of life and where the local authorities have made plans to mobilize these people and involve them in collective work organizations.

The additional 5 percent is to be used for production installations, sectors and places that need to be involved in collective life but the localities have not made plans to mobilize and organize the producers and businessmen to engage in a collective way of life.

The added tax is not to be used for production installations, sectors or places that do not need to be organized for collective life and that can have higher labor productivity or that can support the people more conveniently if allowed to engage in dispersed production and business enterprise activities.

In accord with the guidance of the Ministry of Finance, the provincial and municipal people's committees and the people's committees of the special zones subordinate to the central echelon, things must be based on the real situation of the local production and business enterprise operations and on the socialist transformation policies for industry and commerce in order to specifically apply the stipulations concerning whether or not to have each production installation in each sector pay an added tax.

### 3. Concerning temporary business taxes:

In order to manifest the effect of the temporary business tax in market management and help produce goods and keep them under state control, Article 3 of the 23 June 1980 Order of

the Standing Committee of the National Assembly has added a tax of 15 percent to the temporary business tax tables; this is for large-scale temporary business transactions. Thus, the temporary business tax policies presently include five tax rates: 5, 7, 10, 12 and 15 percent. The minister of finance has specifically stipulated the types of goods and business levels placed in the business category to which the 15 percent tax rate applies.

4. Concerning the butcher's tax, Article 4 of the 23 June 1980 Order has changed Point 1 of Resolution No 489 NQ/QHK4 of 26 September 1974 as follows:

"The butcher's tax on slaughtered buffaloes, cattle and hogs must follow the rate of 10 percent of the value of the slaughtered animal and the guided purchase price of the state."

In order to manifest the effect of the butcher's tax and stimulate people engaged in animal husbandry to increase the weight of the livestock going to market to be slaughtered and fulfill their obligations to sell products to the state, the Office of the Prime Minister has stipulated the following specific points in applying the policies:

a. The maximum and minimum weights (live) for calculating the butcher's tax for each slaughter hog are 60 and 40 kilograms respectively. There is no additional butchers' tax for slaughter hogs above 60 kilograms. Hogs below 40 kilograms must pay the same tax as hogs weighing 40 kilograms.

Based on the animal husbandry practices and the conditions in each locality, the minister of finance will provide specific guidance to the provinces and municipalities concerning stipulating the weights of slaughter hogs, buffaloes and cattle and prices for calculating the butcher's tax.

b. As for agricultural families that are obligated to sell hogs after they have fulfilled their obligations to the state and non-agricultural families that have exhausted their capabilities to raise livestock, when slaughtering the hogs they have raised, they can reduce the butcher's tax 25 percent on the meat reserved for [home use]; there is no tax reduction on the portion of the meat sold outside.

c. In order to encourage the localities to expand animal husbandry and promote the purchase of hogs, buffaloes and cattle to supply meat to satisfy the needs for which the state

is responsible, from now on state commerce and food products business [installations] must pay the butcher's tax at the locality where the livestock were purchased. The entire amount collected from the butcher's tax must be reserved for the local budget to supply slaughter livestock and, of this, 15 percent must be reserved for the village budget.

5. The minister of finance is responsible for explaining things and for specifically guiding the implementation of the entire industrial and commercial tax statute promulgated in accord with Resolution No 200 NQ/TVQH and the additions and revisions in accord with the 23 June 1980 Order of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly.

6. This directive must be implemented uniformly throughout the entire country beginning on 1 July 1980.

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CSO: 4209

## ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

### JOURNAL LISTS STATISTICS FOR 1977-1979

OWI41717 Hanoi VNA in English 1533 GMT 24 Jul 80

(Text) Hanoi, VNA, July 24--In its column "Do You Know?" the pictorial magazine VIETNAM gives the following statistics about development in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:

--According to official statistics, by 0:00 hour on the 1st October, 1979, the total population of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was 52,741,766 (males: 48.5 percent, females: 51.5 percent). 19.17 percent of the population live in the urban centres, and 80.83 percent in the countryside. 2,731 persons are over 100 years old.

--The S.R.V.N. has more than 60 ethnic minorities (totalling more than 3.3 million inhabitants) living on two-thirds of its land area and in regions of strategic importance politically, economically and militarily.

--Among the 2,574 delegates to the National Assembly (from the first to sixth legislatures), there are 371 deputies of 33 ethnic groupings (14.4 percent).

--Six colleges, 28 tertiary schools and two political schools (in Bac Thai and Vinh Phu provinces and in Hanoi and Tay Nguyen--the central highlands) are reserved for students of minority origin. More than 5,000 children of minority nationals have graduated from high-learning establishments and 37 have attained the level of master-of-science.

--By 1978, the mountain provinces of Vietnam had 428 medical establishments with 32,266 beds. 1,392 minority nationals had graduated doctor and assistant-doctors, one master-of-sciences in medicine and one in pharmacy. On an average, there were 44 hospital beds and 8.3 doctors and assistant-doctors for every 10,000 people--a rate equal to that in delta provinces.

--Vietnam now has 250,000 university- and college-level scientific and technical cadres, including more than 3,500 post-graduates. Eighty-three professors, 347 assistant-professors, more than 20,000 college-level

cadres and nearly 2,000 post-graduates are working at universities or scientific research centres.

In the 1977-1978 academic year, Vietnam had 46 tertiary schools with 150,000 students. In 1978-1979 there were 152 centrally-run and 127 locally-run middle-level professional schools with 131,500 trainees and 38,003 newly enrolled students.

--1,180,150 children are being cared for at 44,445 creches, 63.3 percent of which provide daily meals to the kids; 39.8 percent of the creches teach the children according to an official curriculum. Creche attendants now total 158,049.

--in Hanoi alone, 19 million cinema and theatre tickets are sold each year--an average of at least 10 tickets per inhabitant.

--Vietnam has 701 hospitals (including 150 provincial and 477 district-level), 63 infirmaries, 8,489 village health stations, 7 research institutes with hospital beds, and 92 sanatoriums with a total of 184,277 beds. All the districts have their hospitals and 88 percent of the villages have their health stations.

--Vietnam has 12,920 doctors (one doctor per 4,000 inhabitants), 28,620 assistant-doctors, 5,210 pharmacists, 4,636 assistant-pharmacists, 2,534 hospital technicians, 33 doctors of medical sciences, 10 doctors of pharmacy, 97 masters-of-sciences in medicine and 34 in pharmacy.

CSO: 4220

## AGRICULTURE

### AGRICULTURE MINISTER VIEWS DEVELOPMENT

OW231850 Hanoi VNA in English 1754 GMT 23 Jul 80

[**"National Day Series: 35 Years of Agricultural Development"--VNA headline**]

[Text] Hanoi, VNA, July 23--"Since the August revolution of 1945 Viet Nam's agriculture under the leadership of the revolutionary administration has seen changes through the various stages of the revolution."

This assessment was made by Nguyen Ngoc Truu, minister of agriculture, in an article published in a recent issue of VIET NAM COURIER. Following are large excerpts from his article:

#### 1. Deep Revolutionary Changes in the Countryside and in Agriculture in the North

The countryside in the north has gone through two turning points since the August revolution: the success of the agrarian revolution which gave the land back to the tillers and the completion of agricultural co-operation which made the peasantry master of the countryside.

#### The Agrarian Revolution

The French imperialists maintained and defended the feudal ownership of land and the rule of the landlord class over the peasantry. At the same time they were themselves the biggest landlords, having grabbed land from the peasants by the most predatory methods. The landlord class which accounted for about 3 percent of the communal land is [word indistinct] taken into account, the landlord class population appropriated 24.5 percent of the cultivated land. If the communal land is also taken into account, the landlord class actually controlled about 50 percent of the total land area. The working peasantry which consisted mainly of landless and poor peasants accounting for nearly 60 percent of the population owned 12 percent of the land, most of which had little fertility. The poorest peasants, in particular, who made up 20.6 percent of the population owned no more than 1.2 percent of the land. This feudal and

colonialist land ownership together with the regime of brutal exploitation by imperialism condemned the overwhelming majority of the Vietnamese peasants to utter misery and kept the Vietnamese nation in abject poverty and backwardness.

The land problem has been solved by the Vietnamese communists step by step through a process of the revolutionary mobilisation. Each step has its own requirements dictated by the peculiarities and targets of a given stage of the revolution, but all aim at the final goal of abolishing the feudal relations of production which had checked the development of the Vietnamese society for so many centuries.

Through the movement for land rent reduction and land reform more than 810,000 hectares of cultivable land were distributed to 2,104,158 families of peasants and other strata of the working people totalling 8,323,626 persons and accounting for 72.6 percent of the households in the countryside. At the same time were also distributed to the peasants 146,000 farm implements, 106,446 draught animals and 148,565 houses. The landlord class was overthrown, feudal land ownership was abolished, and the land ownership of the working peasants and their political predominance in the countryside was established. "Land to the toilers" came true, marking a historical turning point in the development of the countryside and of society as a whole in the north.

#### **Socialist Transformation of Agriculture**

Entering the three-year plan (1958-1960) following the period of post-war economic rehabilitation, the revolutionary administration set forth the task of socialist transformation of the various economic sectors along with building the state-owned economic sector.

The movement for agricultural co-operation unfolded as planned, proceeding from the lower forms to the higher forms and developing into a high tide of socialist transformation in the northern countryside in the years 1959-1960. To combine cooperation with irrigation and with the rational organisation of the work force in the countryside was a correct orientation worked out by the revolutionary administration for leading the building and development of the co-operatives in the past two decades.

The co-operation movement was closely followed by a campaign for improved management of the co-ops and improvement of the (farming techniques) with a view to an all-round, vigorous and steady development of agriculture, then by a campaign for reorganisation of production from the grassroots up combined with the building of the district into a strong economic unit. Through these campaigns the co-ops were step by step consolidated and stabilized organisationally.

There have emerged in the north many advanced co-ops like Dinh Cong in Thanh Hoa, Vu Thanh in Thai Binh and many others in Ha Nam Ninh and Hai

Hung which have achieved an average annual output of 6-10 tons of paddy per hectare and raised 3-5 pigs per hectare of cultivated land.

With the agricultural co-operation movement coupled with the consolidation and development of the state-owned agricultural farms, socialist relations of production took shape in agriculture. Agricultural co-operation marked the second turning point in the countryside following the land reform. This was a peaceful but far-reaching and thorough-going revolution which ushered in a new period of development in the countryside and agriculture of north Viet Nam.

### Big Achievements

Through the above revolutionary campaigns agricultural production in the north has experienced profound changes and obtained notable achievements which have allowed it to meet the basic demands of the various stages of the revolution.

After the historic Dien Bien Phu victory which put an end to the anti-French resistance, the revolutionary administration made it a pivotal task of restoring agricultural production to solve the food problem and lay the basis for the restoration and development of industry and commerce.

The wounds of war--including 145,000 hectares of land left uncultivated, six major irrigation projects destroyed, extensive damage to the dikes and dams and large numbers of cattle killed--were quickly healed. As early as 1956 the rice area already reached 2,282,000 hectares, 17 percent larger than in the pre-war period, and rice output reached 4,135,000 tons, up 46 percent. This, together with successes in other fields like animal husbandry and the expansion of subsidiary and industrial crops, brought to a successful close the period of economic rehabilitation and created favourable conditions for the revolution to forge ahead.

In the three-year plan of economic development which followed (1958-1960) agricultural production in the north continued to record new achievements, reaching an all-time high in 1959 with a total output of 5,193,000 tons of rice, up by more than 60,000 tons compared with 1958, and an annual average yield of 2,284 kilograms per hectare.

1961 saw the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan (1961-1965). But it was interrupted by the U.S. war of destruction against the north which compelled the revolutionary administration to change to a two-year wartime plan. Agricultural production in this period was step by step reorganised and, in spite of the war, recorded new successes in various fields, thus meeting the needs of the anti-U.S. resistance, socialist construction as well as contributing to the improvement of the people's life.

Most notable are the achievements in the building of the material and technical bases of agriculture and in the application of new farming techniques. The contingent of scientific and technical workers in agriculture increased substantially and more establishments for the study of agricultural sciences were set up. Capital investments in agriculture accounted for 10-15 percent of total investment in the national economy in the period 1958-1960. This percentage was progressively increased to 16-23 percent in the period 1961-1967. A movement to build irrigation works and rearrange the fields quickly gained momentum--the small plots with irregular forms and meandering boundaries and served by irrigation and drainage canals lined with rows of trees acting as protective screens against strong wind.

More and more tractors were introduced along with large numbers of other farming machines like motor pumps, rice-husking machines, threshers and animal fodder processing machines. Chemical fertilizers and insecticides were also used in ever greater quantities. New scientific gains were put to the service of the intensive cultivation of rice, epizootic prevention and treatment, the growing of an additional rice crop in spring, the cultivation of green manure plants like azolla and dien thanh (sesbania), the intensive cultivation of subsidiary crops and industrial plants, the cross-breeding of pigs, the creation of higher-yield species of silk worms, etc., bringing satisfactory results on various scales in many fields.

In the period 1966-1967 the intensive bombing by the enemy and repeated natural disasters caused some decrease in the food crop area which, however, still was 300,000 hectares larger than in 1958. In particular, the area of subsidiary crops kept increasing quickly and continually: from 11.5 percent of the total crop area in 1958 to 22.8 percent in 1967. The area of high-yield rice (five tons per hectare in a year) continued to expand, accounting for 26.2 percent of the two-crop-per-year rice area in 1967. The industrial crop area almost doubled in the same period, expanding from 100,000 hectares in 1957 to 190,000 hectares in 1967. From 1961 to 1968 the number of buffaloes rose 2.1 percent and that of pigs 4.6 percent. From 1958 to 1967 the area of fresh-water fish increased tenfold and output fivefold. The restructuring of agricultural production, first of all of crop cultivation, continued to progress on the right track. With the introduction of spring rice the annual rice yield increased noticeably. At the same time, an additional crop began to be planted in winter and has expanded ever since. In 1974, rice output was (2.2) tons per hectare, and in the whole of north Vietnam the annual yield was five tons of paddy per hectare for all the two-crop fields. Some districts reaped as many as 6-7 tons and many co-operatives from 7 to 10 tons per hectare per year. Total rice output reached 5,486,000 tons, and the number of pigs rose to 6.3 million, in both cases a more than twofold increase over the period before the August 1945 revolution.

## 2. New Factors in Agricultural Production in the South

After the complete liberation of south Vietnam in 1975 in the extremely difficult and complex situation caused by war and neo-colonialism, new factors have emerged in agriculture in the south under the leadership of the revolutionary power.

The most pressing problem was to help millions of persons displaced by war or by the "forced urbanization" policy of the enemy return to their original places. Then there were more than half a million hectares of land left untilled (some for dozen years) to be restored to production. Right after liberation, the revolutionary power launched a broad mass movement to build irrigation works, dig canals and build reservoirs and dams and restore the old irrigation works. The movement drew millions of people especially in the coastal areas of central Vietnam and the Mekong River delta. This broadened the possibility to multiply and diversify the crops and practice intensive cultivation. The planting of wet rice developed even in the central highlands and in the southeastern part of south Vietnam thanks to the construction of new water conservancy projects.

Along with the abolition of the vestiges of feudal exploitation, steps have been taken to initiate the peasants to collective production through the formation of mutual-aid teams, production collectives and co-operatives, especially in the southern provinces of central Vietnam, stimulated by these factors. Agricultural production in the south has seen new changes notably in the restructuring of the crops in the Mekong Delta.

Many districts in south Vietnam have reaped an average of about 4 tons per hectare on tens of thousands of hectares during the dry season crop. Many individual peasants in a number of localities such as Hong Ngu and Cao Lanh in Dong Thap Province, Phu Tan in An Giang Province, have reaped as many as 7-8 tons per hectare for a single crop. Meanwhile, subsidiary crops have been grown extensively, especially in the central provinces. In the pre-liberation days the subsidiary-crop area was negligible (140,000 hectares in 1973). The figure rose to 444,200 hectares in 1977 and continued to expand in the following years.

In addition, many state farms and army farms have been or are being set up in the south. Among the farms specializing in rice and industrial crops many have begun to make some profits thus contributing to the common economic development of the whole country.

With the achievements obtained in the north and the newly emerging factors in the south, total food grain output in Vietnam in 1976 reached 13.5 million tons (rice and rice equivalent of subsidiary crops) including 12.07 million tons of rice. This is a twofold increase in terms of rice output and more than double in terms of total food output compared with

1943, which was a normal year in the pre-revolution days (6.04 million tons). This rate of increase speaks volumes for the great potentials of Vietnam's agriculture, the correctness of the line of the Communist Party on agricultural development and the creativeness of the Vietnamese peasantry.

However, not everything has been plain sailing in agricultural development in Vietnam. Especially in the last few years, many hurdles have cropped up and in some instances there have appeared signs of prolonged stagnation.

This situation has objective causes: the consequences of more than 30 years of war along with frantic sabotage by the imperialists and international reactionaries, successive natural disasters (droughts, floods, typhoons, crop pests). But there have also been subjective reasons. Necessary modifications have been slow to come in economic leadership in general and in agricultural leadership in particular in spite of the changes in the situation since the liberation of south Vietnam.

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## AGRICULTURE

### 'VNA' VIEWS CHANGES IN HO CHI MINH CITY AREA

OW231933 Hanoi VNA in English 1833 GMT 23 Jul 80

[("National Day Series: Changes on the 'Land of Steel'"--VNA headline)]

[Excerpts] Hanoi, VNA, July 23--Cu Chi, a suburban district of Ho Chi Minh City known by people throughout the country as the "Land of Steel" has witnessed many changes since liberation.

The population of Cu Chi has swollen rapidly since liberation, at the rate of about 10,000 a year, due partly to a high birth rate, partly to the return of villagers who had gone away, and also to the policy of decongesting Ho Chi Minh City. Local food production falls short of local needs. The state has had to supply food to the non-agricultural population which rose to 66,000 by 1978. The families of people killed or wounded in the war account for 36 percent of the total in the district and they are given preferential treatment by the government. Difficulties are innumerable.

After solving the most pressing needs of the population in food and housing, the leadership has turned its thought to questions of longer term, first and foremost, that of building, and transforming the local economy along socialist lines.

After abolishing the vestiges of feudal and capitalist exploitation and putting the plantations and ricefields under the collective ownership of the peasantry, Cu Chi embarked on the road of co-operation. To date, the district already has three pilot agricultural co-operatives, and 150 production collectives of farmers embracing 25 percent of the peasant families and 4 percent of the tilled area. In spite of difficulties and the inevitable mistakes of the initial period, all these units have clearly demonstrated the superiority of collective farming.

Cu Chi has also set up two state farms both bearing the name of hero Pham Van Coi (a guerilla of Cu Chi who was credited with killing or wounding 120 American and Saigon troops in twenty battles). The second Pham Van Coi farm covers more than 3,000 hectares in the former

liberated zone. The farm population numbers more than 4,000 including the workers' families. Most of them are former inhabitants of Ho Chi Minh City who were petty traders or supplied services of various kinds and included a number of unemployed or vagrants under the former regime. A sizable part of them came here as members of the young volunteers' brigades for building new economic zones. Established in early 1977, the farm specializes in raising food crops and milch cows. At present, most of the land in the former heavily bombed areas have been restored and planted with sorghum, maize, manioc, beans and ground-nuts. The tilled area, now only a few hundred hectares, will soon be expanded to 1,000 hectares.

To strengthen the newly-established production relations Cu Chi makes a point of increasing the material and technical bases while boosting agricultural production.

To date, more than 80,000 mines have been defused and 10 duds retrieved, freeing more than 10,000 hectares for cultivation and bringing the total area of agricultural land to nearly 33,000 hectares. This land is being divided into four specialized zones for the growing of rice, animal fodder, vegetables, and short-term industrial plants respectively.

Irrigation is considered the primary technical measure. In the three years 1976-1978, 615,010 people were mobilized to dig two major systems of irrigation canals totalling 50 km in length to water and drain 8,000 hectares of rice and 3,000 hectares of subsidiary crops. By the end of 1979, a system of power supply lines had been completed in the district. This made it possible to operate two pumping stations each with a capacity of 3,000 cubic metres per hour. Traditional irrigation from wells and ponds is still widely used.

Many improvements in cultivation methods have been made to suit the new conditions: restoring the herd of draught buffaloes and oxen, replacing imported chemical fertilizer with green manure; replacing the old low-yield rice strains with new ones having higher yields and better resistance to pests.

At the same time, a new agricultural calendar is being introduced to stabilize production. This is an event of a revolutionary character since it makes it possible to grow two or even three crops a year on former one-crop land. In 1979, the tilled area was 45,082 hectares and the coefficient of land utilisation was 1.7, crop yields reached 71,000 tons of food (paddy and subsidiary crops) and per capita food production was 355 kilos, not counting 5,400 tons of ground-nuts. The number of buffaloes rose to 15,000, that of oxen and cows to 18,000, that of pigs to 22,000 and that of poultry to 250,000. Cu Chi is now part and parcel of the "green belt" of Ho Chi Minh City.

Socialist transformation of industry and commerce has been basically completed. The district already counts 260 small-industry handicraft establishments including production co-operatives or groups set up by private citizens. Noteworthy are the machine repair factory, the animal feed factory, the ice factory, 86 rice-husking machines, 7 sugar-making shops, 14 oil presses, 4 rice-fritter shops and one brick kiln. The trade service has also set up a network including goods stores, restaurants, and food stores at the district centre and retail shop and buying and selling co-operative in each village.

Even more striking is the progress achieved in the social field. The medical service has two hospitals of 200 beds each, three consulting rooms, 18 village health stations, and 18 maternity homes staffed by an average of one doctor or assistant-doctor for every 3,000 inhabitants. They reflect the determination of the administration to care for the health of the people after long years of hardships. Illiteracy has been eradicated through crash courses after 18 months and the educational system now comprises 18 infant schools, 21 primary schools, 20 junior high schools and three senior high schools together with 131 complementary courses for adults. Enrolment at general-education schools in the 1978-79 school-year was 50,000; that is, one out of every four inhabitants is going to school. Mass cultural activities are being expanded. On an average, the village art troupes, the art ensemble and mobile projection team of the district, and the art ensembles of the city give two shows per month, drawing hundreds of thousands of spectators. A theatre with nearly one thousand seats was recently inaugurated. Other cultural activities such as photo exhibitions, bookstores, libraries, radio and television broadcasts also contribute to improving the cultural standards of the masses. Vestiges of the former decadent and reactionary culture are being gradually swept away. Backward customs and social evils left by the old regime such as robbery, theft, gambling, prostitution and drug addiction have dropped sharply.

Cu Chi has experienced a real metamorphosis since liberation.

CSO: 4220

## AGRICULTURE

### HANOI VCP STANDING COMMITTEE DIRECTIVE ON AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 22 May 80 pp 1, 4

[Text] On 16 May, the Municipal Party Committee Standing Committee issued a directive on a number of urgent matters to strengthen agricultural production cooperatives.

After assessing the specific achievements and remaining shortcomings of agricultural cooperatives after implementing Directive No 208 of the Party Central Committee Secretariat over the past 3 years, the Municipal Party Committee Standing Committee indicates a number of urgent tasks to be satisfactorily carried out to consolidate agricultural cooperatives:

1. It is necessary to stabilize the scales of cooperatives and the various forms of labor organizations therein.

To consolidate cooperatives and step up production development, a primary task is to stabilize their organizational situation and strengthen their management. In view of the conditions of their material and technical facilities and the managerial standard of their present cadres, the scales of our suburban cooperatives are generally considered appropriate and must, therefore, be stabilized and consolidated.

--It is necessary to firmly maintain and further develop a number of cooperatives on a scale of more or less than 500 hectares where the situation has become relatively stable and where production has continued to increase. As for some cooperatives where, owing really to their too large scale, cadres are weak and can hardly carry out management satisfactorily, where production has decreased and which have little prospect of being consolidated in a few years to come--district party committees must carefully examine their situation prior to deciding to rationally reorganize them but must, should this be the case, report to the Municipal Party Committee Standing Committee which will then carry out investigations and express its opinion. What must be borne in mind is the need to proceed cautiously and to avoid taking uniform action without distinction. It is necessary to carefully consider both the immediate and long-term interests, to make adequate overall preparations--especially concerning cadres--to choose the most appropriate time to take action and to provide close guidance.

--It is necessary to consolidate permanent production units as befits their role as principal owners of the land assigned to them by cooperatives and also because they are units which do work on contract with cooperatives and which are responsible for the final product. Generally speaking, the size of each unit must be about 40 to 60 laborers to do farming on 20 to 30 hectares; this size may be smaller in the mountainous regions and vegetable growing areas. It is absolutely not necessary to divide into smaller ones those units which have a larger size but which have been properly managed. The production task, manpower, fields, buffalos, oxen and farming implements of production units must also be stabilized.

Beside consolidating permanent production units, specific local situation must be taken into account in rationally organizing and consolidating production servicing units (specialized ones) such as civilian laborers' units for water conservancy (like Unit 202), farmland water conservancy units, seed task units, transport units, mechanical units and so forth. Wherever there are soil preparing and fertilization producing units which work for the entire cooperative but which have been irrationally set up and managed, they may be reorganized into smaller teams subordinated to production units. Generally speaking, units and teams which serve production purposes must be soundly organized but care must be taken to avoid applying the same method everywhere and weakening the permanent production units.

## 2. To develop production, land must be properly managed and fully used.

Since lands and fields are the principal production means in agriculture, cooperatives must unify their management and draw up plans to fully use them in order to develop production, strengthen the collective ownership and economy system and improve the management of material supplies, working implements such as plows, harrows and machines, and also seeds so as to prevent deterioration and waste. It is necessary to resolutely correct shortcomings in land use and to retrieve lands and fields which have been encroached on, occupied and used contrary to the policy; at the same time, measures must be taken to encourage the full use of fallow fields, lakes and ponds, to properly use the 15-percent area reserved for collective animal husbandry and to prevent the unilateral use of this portion or its distribution as an additional allotment to cooperative members. The surplus land left uncultivated by cooperatives must be lent to organs, troops, schools and cooperative members for a fixed period of time according to each type of crop but this action must not be allowed to affect the cooperatives' fulfillment of their obligations, man-days, fertilizer production task and production schedules.

## 3. Labor must be properly managed and the contract work, reward and penalty systems correctly applied.

Since each cooperative is a production and business unit, it must be managed in such a way as to ensure planned production, economically effective business and uniformity of management, business and distribution.

Districts must help cooperatives properly manage labor according to (scientifically determined) norms used as a basis for paying wages according to the work performed (in terms of both value and product) so as to correctly apply the principle of distribution according to labor in cooperatives; at the same time, the policy toward priority targets and basic cadres must be strictly implemented.

It is necessary to improve and correctly implement the contract work, reward and penalty systems based on accurately fixed norms on man-days, expenses and material supplies in order to encourage good working units and active laborers; efforts must be made to rapidly eliminate the "average" method of paying wages and giving out rewards and penalties and also to stop the habit of "showing tolerance in evaluating achievements and liberalism in rating" laborers. Beside letting out on contract entire tasks to units or part of them to individual laborers, technically complex tasks related to certain crops, domestic animals and trades may be let out on contract under various forms to individual laborers and cooperative member households provided that the following fundamental principles are applied:

--Cooperatives must uniformly manage production means (fields, buffalos, oxen, tools and the principal technical supplies) to carry out production according to plans. It is necessary to expand the material-technical bases of cooperatives, to formulate and implement uniform technical regulations and standards and to develop the technical progress made by cooperatives.

--A sound management of labor will help develop the collective labor force, fully use the working abilities of cooperative members and their households, strengthen the collective economy of cooperatives and induce cooperative members to closely associate themselves with the cooperatives' collective economy.

--Cooperatives must wisely manage and firmly control all of their products, carry out distribution uniformly in accordance with the policy and correctly associate the interests of the state with those of the cooperatives and their members.

4. To consolidate and improve cooperative management, it is necessary to bring into play the positive role of management and inspection boards, unit chiefs and their deputies, to develop the cooperative members' role as collective owners and to apply the "five opennesses" formula--that is:

- a. To post up public notices on production expenses and taxes paid to the state.
- b. To publish the state of purchased, used and stored means of production.
- c. To publish the cooperative's income including the volume of products and the money obtained from their sale.
- d. To publish the founding and use of various funds.

6. To clearly publish the man-days performed by and rating given to each cooperative member, the norm according to which grain is distributed to each laborer and the quantity of fertilizer sold by each household to the collective.

The managerial standard of each category of cooperative must be taken into account in implementing these five points all together or step by step with a view to achieving realistic results and avoiding formalism.

The masses must be motivated to struggle against negative practices within cooperatives--especially against the bad habit of holding banquets, embezzling the cooperative's funds and property and encroaching on and occupying land--thus turning the masses into real owners of the result of their work and inducing them to carry out production enthusiastically.

3. In consolidating cooperatives at the present time, it is necessary to stress managerial improvement and the work concerning cadres which are the most important and closely related tasks, to consider the training and improvement of cadres most important and to pay attention to the contingent of new cadres of cooperatives, unit chiefs and their deputies, secretaries of primary party organizations and technical and professional cadres.

The directive goes on to say:

The dissemination and execution of the present directive must be coordinated with the dissemination and execution of the government resolutions on grain obligation stabilization and other basic tasks under the present urgent circumstances in order to achieve uniformity of action and effectiveness.

The Agricultural Service must urgently draw up a specific plan to guide districts and cooperatives to carry out the present directive.

The Agricultural Committee must help the Municipal Party Committee carry out inspection to ensure strict execution of the present directive, to promptly detect localities which have worked satisfactorily and use their experiences for guidance's purposes, and to rectify shortcomings.

The various sectors in the municipality must review the fulfillment of their own responsibilities for serving agricultural production and promoting the strengthening and consolidation of cooperatives. Each sector must assign one of its cadres to the committee especially in charge of promoting agriculture.

The youth and women's organizations and the Collectivized Peasants' Union must positively develop the masses' role as collective owners and contribute to consolidating cooperatives and stepping up production.

The organizational committee and other committees in the Municipal Party Committee must, together with district party committees, take advantage of

the movement for production and improved management of agricultural co-operatives to carry out the political task of party organizations within cooperatives, to heighten the quality of party members and organizations, to train and improve cooperative cadres and to rationally arrange party organizations within villages, cooperatives and production units by taking the production situation into consideration, reducing the number of indirectly productive people and increasing the number of party members in units directly engaged in production. The organizational committee and the agricultural board of the Municipal Party Committee must draw experiences from the assignment of cadres to villages in Gia Lam District and disseminate them among other districts.

In the opinion of the Municipal Party Committee Standing Committee, consolidating agricultural production cooperatives is a simultaneously urgent, basic and long-term task designed to properly carry out the resolution of the Seventh Congress of Party Organization Delegates on agricultural development in the rural areas of the municipality.

The various sectors and levels must draw up specific plans to carry out the present directive strictly and creatively.

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## AGRICULTURE

### CAUSES OF DECLINING RICE YIELDS EXAMINED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 16 Jun 80 p 2

[Article by Tam Huyen, Hanoi: "Some Thoughts on the Winter Crop and the Two Rice Crops in the Red River Delta"]

[Text] The guideline for resolving the grain problem in the Red River Delta is to practice intensive cultivation and multicropping. As regards multicropping, there are two different opinions: raising three rice crops per year or two rice crops and one subsidiary food crop.

Neither technical conditions nor the actual situation over the past many years have allowed us to raise three wet rice crops over a large area. Raising two rice crops and one subsidiary food crop is a correct and effective guideline. The intensive cultivation of two rice crops (spring rice and 10th month rice) and the expansion of winter crop production are a correct guideline. These guidelines enable us to rapidly increase the output of grain, accelerate livestock production, produce additional food products and provide fertiliser for the intensive cultivation of both rice and subsidiary food crops. Rotation cultivation and companion cropping between wet rice and dry-land crops also have the effect of improving the soil and increasing its fertility.

The situation has not developed in a favorable manner over the past several years. Winter crop production has been expanded to 270,000-300,000 hectares but rice output has declined; grain output has increased slowly and, at some places, grain output has not increased and livestock production has not been accelerated.

This situation raises many questions: why have the yield and output of rice declined? Has the expansion of winter crop production adversely affected rice production? What problems must be resolved in order to expand winter crop production while still practicing the intensive cultivation of two rice crops?

## I. Why Was Winter Crop Production Expanded?

Winter crop production was expanded because it represents the correct economic guideline for developing the capabilities we have in our arable land, labor and material-technical bases for the purpose of raising crops suited to the weather and climatic conditions of the delta, raising short-term crops that produce a high output. At the Phan Kha, Cam Dinh, An Binh and Viet Hoa Cooperatives in Hai Hung Province, winter crop output averages from 30 to 35 tons per hectare. Some crops produce both a high output and are of high economic value. In Hai Hung Province, the output value of winter crops in 1978 was 140 million dong, 35 percent of the province's agricultural output value; in 1979, it was 400 million dong, 2.8 times greater than in 1978 (including some 400,000 tons of grain). The Thang Long, An Binh and Thanh Hai Cooperatives in Hai Hung Province earn from 1.2 to 1.5 million dong from winter crops. Many cooperatives and cooperative member households earn a good income from winter crops.

In the face of the decline in rice production over the past several years (in some provinces, production has declined by hundreds of thousands of tons) and the maintenance of normal obligations, without the hundreds of thousands of tons of subsidiary food crops and grain produced during the winter season, the lives of millions of farmers would be unstable, even in such important rice producing provinces as Thai Binh, Hai Hung and Ha Nam Ninh. It is clear that the life of the people has been stable and livestock production has been maintained and developed to some extent as a result of winter crops.

Winter crop production has also been rapidly increased because it is of practical benefit to the laborer. This season produces hundreds of thousands of winter crops that are not included in the grain balance of the state. Ordinarily, collectives contract with families to plant, grow and harvest the product or sell them the product (60-70 percent of western potatoes, 30-40 percent of tomatoes, 40-50 percent of watermelons and so forth). At the An Binh Cooperative, the value of winter crops in 1979 was 1.1 million dong; the cooperative only collected 477,000 dong worth, the remaining 641,000 dong worth went to cooperative members.

## II. Why Have the Yield and Output of Rice Declined? Has the Expansion of Winter Crop Production Affected the Two Rice Crops?

Over the past several years, the yield and output of rice have declined significantly compared to 1974 and 1976, years during which rice yields were high. In 1979, Thai Binh's yield declined by 80,000 tons compared to 1976 and by 100,000 tons compared to 1974; Ha Nam Ninh Province's yield declined by 215,000 tons and 189,000 tons respectively; Hai Hung Province's yield declined by 58,000 tons and 65,000 tons respectively; and Ha Bac Province's yield declined by 26,000 tons and 38,000 tons respectively.

There are many reasons for the decline in the yield and output of rice. The weather has not been favorable (1976 and 1974 were years of especially favorable weather). In some years, serious natural disasters have occurred and our existing material-technical bases were unable to withstand these disasters. In other years, waterlogging and flooding caused tens of thousands of hectares of crops to be completely lost, thereby reducing yields by hundreds of thousands of tons. The supply of technical materials by the state has declined significantly compared to previous years. Only one-half as much chemical fertilizer has been supplied; in some seasons, only one-third as much has been supplied. There have been many shortcomings in the guidance of economic-technical measures. Production relations have not been regularly strengthened. There are many deficient cooperatives and a number of large-scale cooperatives are unstable; some places have organized many specialized units, thereby weakening the basic production units. Many changes have occurred within the corps of cadres. As regards policies, there are still many shortcomings, grain obligations have not been stabilized and purchasing prices do not provide incentive for production. Within cooperatives, distribution is based on averages and not tightly controlled under contracts, there is no clear responsibility for the management of products, awards and penalties are not fair, misappropriation and waste are extensive, etc.

Each of the factors mentioned above has had an impact upon rice production. At one place or another, certain factors have had a very decisive impact. While the rice yields of all provinces have declined, rice output has declined the least in Hai Hung and Ha Bac Provinces, the two provinces that have expanded winter crop production the most rapidly. In Hai Hung Province, many districts have expanded their winter crop production to 40-50 percent of their cropland and many cooperatives have expanded winter crop production to 70-80 percent of their cropland while still recording high rice yields; meanwhile, some districts and cooperatives that raise few winter crops still have low rice yields. As a result, it cannot be said that rice yields have declined because the amount of area under the cultivation of winter crops has been expanded.

Winter crops themselves increase the output of grain. By practicing rotation cultivation of dry-land crops and wet crops, rice yields can be increased. If legumes are raised during the winter, more nitrogen is put into the ground. However, it must be recognized that the expansion of winter crops can affect rice yields. To deny this effect and only emphasize the positive effect is to lack objectivity. This effect is large or small depending upon the guidance and management of production.

Due to the expansion of winter crop production, many technical measures cannot be fully carried out during the spring season if close guidance is not provided. The extensive utilization of tractors, buffalo and cattle to prepare fields for winter crops in September and October can have a certain effect upon the rate at which fields are prepared for spring crops.

The allocation of rice varieties has changed: the use of the Nong Nghiep 8 variety has declined while the use of Nong Nghiep 1A and other short-term varieties has increased. The use of fertilizer has not kept pace with the requirements of multicropping. As a result of expanding winter crop production, not many fields are dry and aerated, consequently, it is difficult to expand the amount of area under the cultivation of duckweed.

As regards the 10th month season, in order to expand winter crop production, it is necessary to prepare Nong Nghiep 1A and Nong Nghiep 23 rice seeds, which are varieties that only yield an average of 25-26 quintals per hectare. If the Dong Nai variety, the Can Tho 2 variety or the 75-6 variety are used, yields are still only 27-28 quintals per hectare. If the amount of area used to raise four crops per year is increased, there is an even greater influence upon the yields of the two rice crops because it is necessary to raise two very short rice crops at a time when we have no very short-term varieties that bear high yields.

Many winter crops require very large amounts of fertilizer. Under the present system of contracts, more fertilizer is applied to vegetables and subsidiary food crops and less to rice.

Besides the cooperatives that raise winter crops well, there are also cooperatives that raise these crops poorly, cooperatives whose rice yields have declined significantly and whose winter crop output has not increased, cooperatives that operate at rather large losses and whose collective economy has not been strengthened, but is, instead, being overpowered.

Analyzing these various influences and finding ways to effectively overcome them represent a correct type of analysis and a revolutionary and scientific attitude.

### III. Which Problems Must Be Resolved in Order To Move Forward?

As regards production guidelines, it should be stated that expanding winter crop production and practicing the intensive cultivation of the two rice crops are totally correct guidelines. On the basis of insuring the intensive cultivation of the two rice crops, positive steps must be taken to expand winter crop production and develop the capabilities we have in our arable land and labor as much as possible. Under present conditions, it is possible to expand winter crops to 40-50 percent of the cropland of the entire country. Cooperatives that have little cropland can use 70 to 80 percent of it for this purpose. Four crops per year can be raised on about 10 percent of our cropland.

On the one hand, we must remodel the thinking on every level, from the provincial level to the installation level, and guard against both

tendencies: the tendency to vacillate, be conservative and not dare to undertake large-scale operations and the tendency to do so despite conditions and without giving attention to economic returns. In Hai Hung and every other province in the Red River Delta, there are localities that have recorded good experiences that must be summarized and analyzed in order to provide overall guidance.

On the other hand, it is necessary to resolve a series of problems regarding economics and technology as well as the organization of guidance in order to create the conditions needed for production during each season. Technically, we must have a stable group of rice varieties for each season, especially short-term, high yield rice varieties for both the spring and 10th month seasons. In Hai Hung, the Nong Nghiep 1A variety of rice has a historical position of its own (80-85 days, 25-30 quintals per hectare yields). With this variety, Hai Hung rapidly expanded winter crop production to 50,000-60,000 hectares. By means of creative labor projects of the locality and with the assistance of the Institute of Grain Crops, Hai Hung successfully and widely propagated the varieties 75-6, Dong Nai and Can Tho 2 (which have a growing period of 90 days and are transplanted during the 10th month season and harvested in late September or early October) and rice variety 75-10 (which has a growing period of more than 100 days and is harvested in late October or early November), all of which have produced yields of 30-35 quintals per hectare over a broad area. Depending upon the group of winter crops in cultivation, the various late rice crops are scheduled in such a way as to achieve the highest possible returns and the highest possible coefficient of safety.

In the 10th month season, Nong Nghiep 22 should be planted on 40 to 50 percent of the area under cultivation; in the spring season, Nong Nghiep 8 and varieties similar to it should be planted on about 70 percent of the area under cultivation.

Without preparing early 10th month rice seed, especially short-term, high yield seed, it is impossible to expand winter crop production and maintain the yields of the two rice crops. The exact percentage of early 10th month rice and the allocation of varieties depend upon the soil conditions and the level of intensive cultivation at each place.

It is also necessary to have a diverse group of winter crops, primarily grain crops (western potatoes and sweet potatoes) for cultivation on about 70 percent of the area planted with winter crops; at the same time, we must expand the production of exported crops (garlic, watermelons and tomatoes), with importance attached to legumes in order to improve the soil and accelerate livestock production. There are differing opinions concerning western potatoes and sweet potatoes. It must be stated that western potatoes are easy to plant, are suited to many types of soil and are a short-term crop that produces a stable yield. Sweet potatoes are

less expensive to plant but their planting season is short, they are only suited to light soil and conditions do not exist for expanding their production.

Winter crop seed must be prepared early. Each crop must be suited to soil conditions, labor and the management qualifications of cadres. The extraction and storage of seed must be well organised before it is possible to take the initiative in planting and achieve economic returns.

There must be a very positive change with regard to fertilizer in order to increase the amount of fertilizer being used by 50 to 100 percent by means of accelerating hog production, planting soybeans, spreading much duckweed and planting sesbania. We are fully capable of rapidly increasing the amount of area under the cultivation of soybeans to tens of thousands of hectares within each province: during the winter season, soybeans should be planted on early (very early) 10th month rice fields in late September; during the spring season, they should be planted on 10th month seedling fields; during the summer-fall season, they should be planted on land used for collective livestock production. (Hai Hung Province has achieved success in planting winter soybeans on 500 hectares, with yields from 700 to 1,000 kilograms per hectare). Thai Binh has rapidly expanded the cultivation of duckweed even on lowlying fields from which winter crops have been harvested. The most important problem in rapidly increasing the sources of fertilizer is the policy problem: we should assign a fertilizer production quota with reasonable prices and provide incentive by supplying grain.

However, it is impossible to operate without chemical nitrogen fertilizer. The state is trying to supply 150 to 200 kilograms of nitrogen sulfate per hectare of winter crops and 150 to 200 kilograms per hectare of rice per season. This can be accomplished by investing nitrogen fertilizer and procuring products under economic contracts and allowing localities to export special products and agricultural products in exchange for chemical nitrogen fertilizer.

At the same time, it is necessary to resolve a series of technical problems related to both rice and winter crops, such as the zoning of specialised production areas, the improvement of farmland water conservancy systems and the supplying of reasonable amounts of irrigation water for both rice crops and for winter crops; organising labor very skillfully in a manner that meets the technical requirements and the planting schedule of each type crop; and, in particular, being concerned with building a seed and breeding stock, tractor station, farmland water conservancy station and supply station system within the district and closely linking the system of stations and farms to cooperatives.

As regards management, it is of utmost importance that we stabilize the size of cooperatives and strengthen the basic production units and a number

of necessary specialized units. Importance must be attached to organizing labor and regulating production; in particular, it is necessary to improve the system of work contracts and product contracts for production units and laborers at an early date.

As regards winter crops (especially western potatoes, garlic and tomatoes), we should expand the use of product contracts for cooperative member households. Recently, in Hai Hung Province, winter production "exploded" as a result of not incorporating winter crops in the grain balance and as a result of contracting with households. Besides the correct ways in which policy has been implemented, there have also been incorrect ways. The mistakes that must be corrected are: contract production costs and workpoints are high but the quantity of products received is low, consequently, collectives cannot control their products and operate at a loss and the state is also unable to purchase products in accordance with the plan.

When contracting with households, it is necessary to adhere to the following principles: making efficient use of the instruments of production of the cooperative in accordance with the plan; the cooperative manages labor, controls practically all products and operates at a profit; strengthening production relations and providing incentive for work so that laborers are close to the cooperative.

In the lowlands, where there is little land but many laborers, we should not provide land under contracts to everyone who wants it or contract with all cooperative members.

In its relationship with cooperatives, the state must soon stabilize the grain obligation of the various localities; winter crops should not be included in this obligation, rather, the state should purchase winter products under economic contracts, reasonably adjust the prices of agricultural products, organize the implementation of two-way economic contracts well, organize the purchasing and processing of agricultural products well, gain experience and make the necessary amendments to the distribution policy within cooperatives.

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## AGRICULTURE

### READERS REVEAL CASES OF RICEFIELDS BEING LEFT UNCULTIVATED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 3 Jul 80 p 3

[From Readers' Letters column: "Ricefields Still Left Uncultivated"]

[Text] After the Council of Ministers adopted the policy of encouraging full use of land, many agricultural cooperatives have appropriately leased land to their members, but still in many localities ricefields were left uncultivated and some cooperatives even had "new policies" of their own, thus hampering production.

Le Van Quang (Thanh Hoa Agricultural Service) revealed the following: In the 1979-1980 fifth-month and spring rice crop season, Thieu Duong Cooperative in Dong Thieu District left idle 11 hectares of ricefields and 50 hectares of alluvium-rich land in which it had grown vegetables and subsidiary food crops in previous years and had obtained high yields from them. The fact that many ricefields were left uncultivated rather than were leased to cooperative members has disappointed farmers and has caused adverse effects on the care needed for the fifth-month and spring rice crop, the yield of which is very low this season.

Phan Si Lam, an agricultural planning cadre in Nghe Tinh Province, gave this information: Dong Son Cooperative in Can Loc District, in this fifth-month and spring rice crop season, left idle more than 5 hectares of good ricefields and tens of hectares of alluvium-rich land on the river banks and refused to lease land to anyone (it only accommodated the need of a number of organs). Meanwhile, it advocated distributing the currently-cultivated ricefields to members, with each member getting 2 thuoc (or 48 square meters), for private rice growing. Some cooperative members who had learned that the neighboring cooperatives encouraged opening of new land also tried to reclaim land on their own initiative -- some of them opened a few thuoc, others a sao [sao equals 360 square meters], still others filled the holes in the fields and planted rice there or in any tiny pieces of land they found unused here and there. On harvest day, the cooperative punished them by charging 30 kilograms of paddy per thuoc (to be deducted from their share of products). Members of the cooperative were very angry and confused as they wondered why the same policy of full use of land was implemented in some places but ignored in other places.

Luc Thanh Toan, P.O. Box 2B-6 (Hanoi), pointed this out: At the end of 1979 when the "an inch of land is an inch of gold" movement was launched, Thanh Tri District urged students, workers and civil servants to do socialist labor for a week by weeding and digging nearly 3 hectares of 2-crop ricefields that had been left uncultivated for a long time. Everybody believed that crops would be grown in these ricefields to help improve the standard of living. But since then the uncultivated land has been remaining uncultivated still, for hogs to wallow in the dry season and cattle to feed on grass in the rainy season.

Several readers in the city of Cam Pha (Quang Ninh Province) complained: Back in 1966, the Housing and Land Office of the city of Cam Pha took a 10-hectare plot to build a stadium. But so far this plot has been left unused for grass to grow. In the Tam Hop area 2.5 kilometers from the city, 3 hectares of land that was said to be used for a flower garden is still left unused.

The readers who share the same opinion have this suggestion to offer: all party committee echelons and local administrations, state farms, state forests, etc. must implement the land policies of the state, particularly the policy that encourages full use of land. The "an inch of land is an inch of gold" movement must be stepped up further. In the winter crop season this year, the policy that calls for leasing to cooperative members any land that the cooperatives cannot handle must be strictly implemented so as to help resolve the grain and food problem.

5598  
CSO: 4209

## AGRICULTURE

### EDITORIAL ADVOCATES PROPER IMPLEMENTATION OF GRAIN POLICY

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 24 May 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Thoroughly Understand and Properly Carry out the Grain Policy"]

[Text] The grain problem is one of special importance to life, production and national defense. Though great efforts have been exerted over the past few years, agricultural production has failed to fulfill the required norms. In view of this situation, the entire party and people and every sector and individual have the duty to positively contribute to solving this common difficulty.

A basic measure to solve the grain problem is to try to step up agricultural production and to ensure satisfactory implementation of plan norms. The immediate tasks are to tend and rapidly and neatly harvest the fifth-month and spring crop, to urgently prepare to satisfactorily cultivate the 10th-month and winter crops, to consolidate agricultural cooperatives and to strengthen the organizational and managerial sector so that it may act as a motive power to press for production development. To obtain more grain, cadres, manual and office workers, armymen, students of colleges and vocational middle schools and nonagricultural households have the obligation to produce grain to achieve partial self-sufficiency and also to economize on grain. Beginning immediately with the harvest of the current fifth-month rice crop, agricultural cooperatives must satisfactorily fulfill their obligations to the state according to the fixed 5-year norms. Apart from the quantity sold at the directed price according to two-way contracts and in addition to the full payment of various taxes and water conservancy fees, peasants must display a high sense of the need to economically use grain and to sell a further amount of grain to the state at an agreed price or in exchange for supplies and commodities.

To help solve the current grain difficulties, it is necessary for the state-supplied sector to temporarily adjust the consumption norms for certain targets while showing concern for cadres, armymen, manual and office workers and dependents, for persons having relationships with the state through economic and cultural contracts, for people covered by the priority policy and for poor laborers' households eligible for social reliefs. The supply

of grain at the directed price must be denied to persons carrying out illegal business and eluding labor performance and to those engaged in free undertakings in certain sectors. With regard to peasants in areas specialized in vegetable cultivation, thriftiness will be exercised through the application of a policy of transfer and circulation [dqoois luu].

The sources of grain must be tightly managed in all the steps involved--production; transportation; contract processing; packing; distribution; fight against theft; shortchanging and waste; regular inspection of grain distribution and use, especially in large collectives; and strict prohibition of moonshine distillation. It is necessary to strengthen measures aimed at managing the market and punishing speculators, hoarders and illegal grain dealers. Simultaneously with intensifying management and the struggle against negative practices, the grain sector must do its utmost to create favorable conditions for consumers in the field of processing, distribution and services.

Carrying out the grain policy is a major task of our entire party and people. First and foremost, it is necessary to make everyone thoroughly understand and energetically implement this policy and to struggle against its distortion by the enemy and bad elements. This is a very difficult and complex task which requires close and intensive guidance by all levels and sectors, adequate organization and execution and specific and effective measures.

Fully aware of the common difficulties facing the entire nation and with their traditional spirit of production and thrift, the people in the capital city--especially cadres and party members--will certainly and actively contribute to properly carrying out the promulgated grain policy.

9332

CSO: 4209

## AGRICULTURE

### QUANG NAM-DA NANG SUMMER-FALL CROP DISCUSSED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Jun 80 p 1

(Text) Quang Nam-Da Nang is guiding production units in the province to make every effort to complete the plan of sowing and transplanting 55,000 hectares of rice, 25,000 hectares of manioc, 4,000 hectares of sweet potato and 8,000 hectares of alpinia chinensis and starch-bearing plants in the summer-fall crop. This is a production season with a fairly large area, comprising 50 percent of the province's annual grain output.

The summer-fall crop in Quang Nam-Da Nang usually suffers from drought early in the season and heavy downpours at the end of it and, consequently, water conservancy work and seasonal guidance must be urgent and specific. The province has the Phu Ninh reservoir which supplies irrigation water for most areas of the two districts of Tam Ky and Thang-Binh but, as pumping stations have run into difficulties with material supplies and electricity and as the irrigation canal and ditch network has progressed slowly, its role has not been totally developed.

Quang Nam-Da Nang has concentrated its efforts on directing the organization of forces, on mobilizing people to dig canals and ditches, and on developing the effect of the existing reservoir and pumping stations; in the meantime, on increasing the digging of ponds, dredging wells, building sea dikes and enveloping dikes to assure sufficient irrigation water for rice, vegetables and secondary crops of the summer-fall season.

Quang Nam-Da Nang is also mobilizing youth forces and school students on summer vacation to participate in the water conservancy work, the production of fertilizer to address the needs for the intensive cultivation and increased yields of rice and secondary crops of the summer-fall crop.

9458

CSO: 4209

GOVERNMENT DECREE RESOLUTION ON CATTLE RAISING.

2071/79 Hanoi Domestic Service to Vietnam 0400 GMT 27 Jul 80

[Text] On 3 October 1979, the Council of Ministers issued Resolution No 373-C7 on policies encouraging cattle raising. In implementation of this resolution to prevent the uncontrolled raising of broodstock, draft and slaughter cattle and to enable various trade organs of the state to control products and goods in terms of slaughter and draft cattle, the Council of Ministers on 19 July issued Decision No 278-C7 specifically revising a number of policies on the circulation of these animals as follows:

1. To satisfy the needs for beef, the Council of Ministers allows the home trade center to establish a fund for the purchase of supplies and goods to deliver directly to cattle raisers on a two-way basis and at agreed-upon prices in exchange for a volume of slaughter cattle in accordance with the annual state collection and purchase plan. The Ministry of Home Trade is required to undertake a study of various kinds of supplies and goods that are necessary and suitable for each area and each period of time and to fix a rational standard for the exchange of these supplies and goods. It must consult with the State Planning Commission in order to enable the latter to determine the norms for using the above-mentioned fund.

Apart from fulfilling the norms set by the state, the home trade center must strive to exceed the planned norms for the purchase of beef and the sale of goods to cattle raisers at agreed-upon prices. The people's committees of various provinces and cities will be responsible for establishing the norms for the collection and purchase of slaughter cattle along with corresponding norms for using the fund provided for the purchase of supplies and goods. These norms will then be forwarded to the cattle raising districts and villages for implementation in accordance with the directions of the Ministry of Home Trade in terms of the prices and quantity of supplies and goods fixed in exchange for each unit of the product purchased.

2. Circulation of cattle: In addition to the number of draft cattle provided by the provincial and district agricultural material supply stations, production establishments and sectors--including individual producers, production solidarity teams, production collectives, agricultural cooperatives and state farms--can buy these animals directly from other provinces, if they find it necessary. However, purchase permission must be obtained from district people's committee in the localities where the animals are sold.

B. [as heard] The people's committee in various provinces and districts are responsible for restoring and setting up cattle markets to create favorable conditions for the people to engage in trading these animals. All merchants, namely cattle dealers, are banned from trading in cattle. For the provinces from Quang Nam-Danang southward in particular, although cattle can be traded and circulated between the provinces, it is necessary for those concerned to apply for cattle trade license in accordance with the criteria provided for various categories of breeder, draft and slaughter cattle.

Each time that cattle are circulated, permission must be obtained from the administration at the district level. In addition to obtaining vaccination certificates from authorized veterinary organs as stipulated by the state, permission for circulation of cattle must be obtained from the administration at the provincial level, if it occurs within a province, and from localities which purchase the animals, if it occurs between two provinces. It is also necessary to follow correctly all regulations concerning the slaughtering and circulation of cattle provided by the state.

3. To protect and develop the number of cattle, in slaughtering these animals, it is necessary to adhere to the following regulations:

—As for slaughter cattle, only those having reached maturity will be slaughtered. The Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for specifically determining the maturity age for each category of cattle. Slaughtering of female cattle which are still fertile is prohibited.

—As for draft cattle, only those unqualified for draft power will be slaughtered. It is necessary for all establishments and individuals to slaughter cattle at slaughter houses, to have their meat inspected by veterinary organs before selling to the public, to pay slaughtering tax, and to sell cattle hide and bones to various state collection and processing organizations.

4. The Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Home Trade and the State Planning Commission are responsible for specifically directing and fully implementing this decision. This decision will become effective from the date of signature. All stipulations contrary to the decision will be abrogated.

LACK OF SMALL PROJECTS HAMBERS WATER CONSERVANCY

DOAN THAN DAN in Vietnamese 16 Jun 80 p 1, 4

[Editorial: "Expanding the Small-Scale Water Conservancy Networks"]

[Text] Coordinating large-scale, medium-scale and small-scale water conservancy projects is a guideline of water conservancy work. This guideline must be flexibly applied to the specific conditions at each place with a view toward developing water and land resources in a manner that yields high returns.

The coordination of the various types of projects must be established on the basis of calculating a wide variety of economic benefits; in some areas, it is necessary to construct large or medium-scale projects while, at other places, only small-scale projects are required. Therefore, when gradually building complete water conservancy systems consisting of all three types of projects, it is necessary to widely expand small-scale water conservancy installations and create the conditions for the intensive cultivation of many crops per year. Large-scale projects virtually resolve the problem of water for individual large areas and are the prerequisite to achieving effective and scientific irrigation and drainage, but they require large investments and take a long time to build. The benefit of small-scale projects is that they are easy to build, are inexpensive and rapidly yield returns. In systems of large and medium-scale projects, many small-scale projects are needed. Existing project systems are being used at a level below their design capacity primarily because of the lack of well-coordinated small projects.

Small projects, which are primarily constructed using non-mechanized equipment, manual labor, rudimentary tools and local materials, have an effect wherever they are constructed. Small-scale water conservancy projects are projects that can be used for small amounts of land as well as large amounts, from an area measuring only several dozen square meters irrigated and drained by simple means (jars, walls, buckets, spinners, "can rot," water wheels and so forth) to fields measuring thousands and tens of thousands

of hectares irrigated and drained by means of canal systems and embankments of various types closely linked to headwater projects. Small-scale water conservancy projects can be constructed and used on all types of terrain, from the high mountains to the seacoast, and on all types of soil, rocky soil, sandy soil, acidic soil and saline soil.

The provinces of the North are only using 50 to 60 percent and the provinces of the South are only using 30 percent of the design capacity of their water conservancy projects. Of the 1.9 million hectares of land for which projects have been constructed, only 400,000 hectares are being partially supported by water conservancy projects due to the lack of small-scale projects within the system. Ditch embankments are broken and ditches are obstructed, thereby creating a waste of water and electricity. Hundreds of thousands of hectares of normally fertile fields outside water conservancy systems must be farmed totally on the basis of rainwater.

Small-scale water conservancy projects have made important contributions to results of production. The improvement of farmland water conservancy systems on nearly 1 million hectares of farmland in the North increased the efficiency of the use of the large-scale water conservancy projects. Small-scale water conservancy projects have had the direct effect of opening 1 million hectares of fields for winter-spring and summer-fall crops in the South. The Gau Che farmland water conservancy system has achieved success in expanding the small-scale water conservancy network in a manner closely linked to improving the management and use of water.

Over the next several years, in order to support the effort to plant all land, practice multicropping and intensive cultivation and resolve the food problem, it is necessary to rapidly expand small-scale water conservancy projects in all agricultural areas, which includes the areas outside systems in order to complete the network and increase the efficiency of irrigation and drainage and the areas outside systems in order to maintain production, practice intensive cultivation and increase the amount of area under cultivation.

In the provinces of the South, especially the Mekong River Delta, of the more than 7 million hectares of rice fields now under cultivation, water conservancy projects only exist for slightly more than 250,000 hectares. As regards the nearly 7 million hectares of land that remain, small-scale water conservancy projects can be constructed in order to clear land and put more land under cultivation. Until the conditions required to construct large headwater projects exist, it is possible to delineate individual areas and fields by means of small-scale projects, such as enclosed embankments, area embankments, ditches, drainage ditches, irrigation ditches and so forth that are enclosed within a system and linked to the major irrigation and drainage canals in order to retain fresh water, block the flow of salt water, reduce the level of acidity or sulfates through leaching and combat drought and waterlogging.

Small-scale water conservancy projects should only be constructed on the basis of established water conservancy planning for the entire area or system so that they are not in conflict with the overall network of the entire area in the future, but become an integral part of it. Small-scale projects must be planned and classified in advance in order to make appropriate investments in their construction and closely link immediate interests with long-range interests. Some types are relatively permanent, some types are temporary projects for specific seasons, some types are retained once headwater projects have been constructed and some types must be discontinued.

The expansion of small-scale water conservancy networks must be supported by means of technical guidance and assistance from the state and necessary equipment that installations do not have.

The district is the level that guides and supervises the construction of small-scale water conservancy projects.

7807  
Water

## AGRICULTURE

### INVESTMENT IN CONSTRUCTION IN AGRICULTURE TO BE EFFECTIVE

Hanoi NHAP DAN in Vietnamese 3 Jul 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Effectiveness of Investment in Construction in Agriculture"]

[Text] The scope of capital construction in all localities is getting larger everyday. Many economic zones are stepping up different projects for watering and draining for thousands of hectares of land, building stables and sties for thousands of domestic animals and building warehouses, seed stations and machine stations for repairing hundreds of vehicles and tractors. Because of the need to strengthen the material and technical base in rural areas, the state has increased the share of investment in construction of agricultural works by 46 percent over the last year, in spite of the fact that total investment in the entire building sector was increased by only 2 percent. While the country still encounters many difficulties, this is an enormous effort to concentrate on developing agriculture for the purpose of quickly resolving the grain and food problem and supplying more and more raw materials for industry and farm products for export.

In the last 6 months, all localities built millions of cubic meters of dikes and dams, completed one-half of the protective dikes and sluices scheduled to be built in the plan for the entire year, afforested 22,000 additional hectares, drew up many projects -- for the Phu Ninh, Nui Coc and Ho Go Lakes and the Han Thach Han, Vu Gia River and other water conservancy systems -- and extended the cultivated areas by more than 30,000 hectares. Although there was obvious progress, the effectiveness of investment in construction in agriculture remained generally low. Capital was divided for too many projects; leadership over construction and assembly work was far from strict; the lack of careful preparations for the material and technical means was the main reason why it took longer to do construction work and more and more construction projects were left unfinished. In every locality there were projects that had been either completed without being synchronised or put to use too late, which not only did not bring any timely benefits to the land but also created obstacles for production, communications and transportation.

As our materials and capital are limited, we cannot spread them out too thinly in order to carry out all of the construction projects that our nations and echelons may request. Investment in construction in agriculture must be within local economic development plans; any accepted project must go through full consideration and careful calculations of the ability to carry it out and of realistic economic effectiveness. The conditions that ensure speedier construction work are to make good preparations for the force in charge of planning and execution of projects, to create abundant sources of building materials in the localities and to cooperate with other localities in the field of production. The leadership method is to have concentrated execution of projects and to quickly and neatly complete the key projects, first the ones that serve the production of grain, foods and goods for export and the ones that produce energy and raw materials for industry.

The construction force must be strengthened in state farms, particularly in nearly 100 state farms that grow rice and industrial crops of high economic values; the ability to execute projects has not yet been raised proportionally to this year's capital investment, which is three times as much as last year's. In state forests, investment in construction must be aimed at maintaining a balance between such jobs as tree planting, tree cutting and transportation. As to water conservancy projects, the effectiveness of investment in construction must be calculated in terms of extending the areas of crop growing, opening additional concentrated-production and specialised-cultivation zones and increasing the watering and draining capabilities.

Capital construction in rural areas plays an important role in creating the structure of industry and agriculture, raising the ability to exploit the potential and existing labor and local resources, stepping up the process of moving from small-scale production to the socialist large-scale production, gradually developing the local economy and improving the standard of living. Attach importance to construction work in rural areas, first of all to taking all the necessary measures to raise the effectiveness of investment in agricultural construction projects, to complete and put them to use within the shortest time, with good quality and the lowest expenses possible.

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## AGRICULTURE

### BRIEFS

**DONG THAP RICE**--To date, Dong Thap Province has transplanted 97,327 hectares of 10th-month rice, overfulfilling the planned norm by 2.7 percent. Along with accelerating the 10th-month rice transplantation, peasants are concentrating on caring for 30,393 hectares of ripening summer-fall rice. [BK241557 Ho Chi Minh City Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1200 GMT 17 Jul 80 BK]

**HAU GIANG 10TH-MONTH RICE**--Hau Giang Province is planning to cultivate 330,000 hectares of 10th-month rice this year, representing about one-fourth of the 10th-month rice area in the entire Mekong Delta. So far it has transplanted some 84,000 hectares of 10th-month rice. [BK241557 Ho Chi Minh City Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1200 GMT 18 Jul 80 BK]

**HAI NUNG RICE**--To date, Hai Nung Province has transplanted 43,440 hectares of 10th-month rice, achieving 35.6 percent of the planned area and recording an increase of 2,107 hectares over the same period last year. [BK241559 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 19 Jul 80 BK]

**CAO BANG RICE PLANTING**--VNA: Simultaneous with the harvesting of the fifth month-spring crop, the Cao Bang province agricultural cooperatives have rationally organized labor and draft power and taken advantage of the seasonal rain to prepare the soil and to plant seedlings for the tenth-month season. As of the end of May the whole province has plowed and harrowed nearly 20,000 hectares of land and sown over 1,400 tons of tenth-month rice seeds. In this season Cao-Bang has expanded its early tenth-month rice area by 10,000 hectares. All of this additional area has been carefully plowed and harrowed, has conserved enough water and has enough seedlings for timely transplanting. Districts have directed cooperatives to be active in preparing enough seeds, material supplies and draft power at the very beginning of the season. The agricultural service has moved hundreds of plowing buffaloes and cows and rice seeds from rear districts to border districts in order to allow the latter to prepare the soil and have sufficient seeds according to the previously planned crop structure. The district of Trung Khanh mobilized each worker to produce 300 kilograms of fertilizer to serve the tenth-month production crop. After a short time cooperatives have collected hundreds of tons of green manure and composted it on early tenth-month ricefields; many production teams produced from 40 to 50 additional tons of fertilizer for the fall crop in a single day. [Text] [Hanoi NHAD BAN in Vietnamese 9 Jun 80 p 1] 9428

## HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

### SILICATE BRICK FACTORY STARTS PRODUCTION AFTER DEDICATION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 3 Jul 80 p 1

[Article: "Dedication of Linh Nam Silicate Brick Factory"]

[Text] Yesterday, 2 July, Hanoi organized in the morning the dedication and start of production of Linh Nam Silicate Brick Factory, whose capacity is 30 million bricks per year. This modern factory of high capacity was built with the aid of the People's Republic of Poland, which also provided it with technical equipment. Thirty projects of various sizes were completed over an area of 4 hectares in the southeastern part of the city. Right from the beginning of the foundation-building work, a team of Polish technicians including many industrial construction, mechanical and thermal power engineers was present and wholeheartedly helped our cadres and workers to execute the projects and to assemble and install machines. In addition to the main-force units of the Hanoi building sector like the Foundation Leveling Corporation, Industrial Construction Corporation, Machine Assembly Enterprise and Project Planning Institute, some units outside of the sector like the Electric Power Enterprise, Bridges and Roads Corporation, Goods Transportation Corporation, etc. also took part in construction work, assembly and installation, and transportation of raw materials, materials and equipment. More than 90 percent of the work on the assembly line, from mixing of materials to the finished product, is mechanized and automated. The main materials used for the making of bricks come from sand in the Red River and limestone.

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## BIOGRAPHIC

### INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. An asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

#### Vũ Khắc Đồng [VUX KHAMCS BOONGF]

\*SRV Ambassador to Nigeria; on 24 June 1980 he presented his credentials to the President of Nigeria. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 28 Jun 80 p 1)

#### Lê Duẩn [LEE ZUANH]

General Secretary of the VCP; recently he left the SRV for a visit to Moscow. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 80 p 1)

#### Nguyễn Việt Dũng [NGUYEENX VIEETJ ZUNGX]

Chief of Cabinet of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly; on 21 June 1980 he was present when Chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee, Truong-Thanh received the Albanian Ambassador. (NHAN DAN 22 Jun 80 p 1)

#### Văn Tiến Dũng [VAWN TIEENS ZUNGX], Senior General

Member of the Political Bureau of the VCP; Minister of National Defense; Recently he attended the departure of General Secretary Le Duan for Moscow. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 80 p 1)

#### Nguyễn Thị Định [NGUYEENX THIJ DINHJ]

\*President of the Vietnam Women's Federation; on 26 June 1980 she was elected to that position. (NHAN DAN 28 Jun 80 p 1)

#### Hoàng Minh Giám [HOANGF MINH GIAMS]

Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the National Assembly; on 17 June 1980 he presided at a meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee. (NHAN DAN 22 Jun 80 p 1)

Nguyễn Hạnh [NGUYEENX HANH]

\*Director of the Vietnam Insurance Corporation; recently he attended meetings with a visiting delegation of the Bulgarian Insurance Corporation. (NHAN DAN 18 Jun 80 p 4)

Trần Văn Hiếu [TRAANF VAWN HIEENR]

Minister of Home Trade; his article "Organize Supply Sources and Improve Grain Distribution in Hai Hung and Haiphong" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 1 Jul 80 p 2)

Hoàng Văn Hiếu [HOANGF VAWN HIEUF]

Alternate Member of the VCP Central Committee; Secretary of the VCP Committee, Thanh Hóa Province; in May he received a Lao delegation from Houa Phan Province, Laos that was visiting his province. (Vientiane SIANG PASASAN 26 Jun 80 p 3)

Nguyễn Văn Hiếu [NGUYEENX VAWN HIEEUS]

Minister of Culture and Information; \*Vice Chairman and \*Secretary General of the Central Guidance Committee for Developing the New Life Style; on 27 June 1980 he was appointed to the two latter positions. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 80 p 1)

Trần Quốc Hoàn [TRAANF QUOOC HOANF]

Member of the Political Bureau of the VCP; recently he attended the departure of General Secretary Lê Duan for Moscow. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 80 p 1)

Phạm Hùng [PHAMF HUNG]

Member of the Political Bureau of the VCP; Vice Premier; Minister of Interior; recently he attended the departure of General Secretary Lê Duan for Moscow. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 80 p 1)

Lê Quang Khải [LEE QUANG KHAIR]

SRV Ambassador to Yemen People's Democratic Republic; on 22 June 1980 he attended the arrival in Yemen of a SRV delegation headed by Minister Phan Hien. (NHAN DAN 24 Jun 80 p 1)

Trần Đăng Khoa [TRAANF DAWNG KHOA]

Deputy Secretary General of the Vietnam Democratic Party; on 29 June 1980 he attended a meeting marking the 36th Anniversary of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (NHAN DAN 30 Jun 80 p 1)

Lê Xuân Lý [LEH XUAN LUWUJ], Major General

\*Head of the Vietnam People's Army Political Academy; on 18 June 1980 he held activities at his school to mark the 29th Anniversary of the Kampuchea Revolutionary People's Army. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 19 Jun 80 p 1)

Trần Văn Minh [TRAANH VAWN MINH], \*Lieutenant Colonel

Of the Military Regulations Department; his article "Have You Strictly Carried Out Regulations in a Situation of Material Shortages?" appeared in the cited source. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 3 Jul 80 p 3)

Võ Thuần Nho [VOX THUAANH NHO]

Vice Minister of Education; on 1 July 1980 he attended an exhibition of Soviet School Supplies in Hanoi. (NHAN DAN 2 Jul 80 p 1)

Vũ Sản [VUX SAWN]

\*A SRV Ambassador to Benin; on 27 June 1980 he presented his credentials to the President of Benin. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 3 Jul 80 p 1)

Bùi Thế Tân [BUIP THEES TAAM], Senior Colonel

Of the Rear Service General Department; his article "Outcome of the Forces' Grain and Food Products Production Movement" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 19 Jun 80 p 3)

Đào Thị Hiền Thị [DAOF THIEENJ THI]

Vice Minister of Finance; recently he received a delegation from the Bulgarian Insurance Corporation. (NHAN DAN 18 Jun 80 p 4)

Nguyễn Trọng Thủ [NGUYEENX TRONGJ THOW]

\*Deputy Secretary of the VCP Committee, Ha Son Binh Province; \*Chairman of the People's Committee, Ha Son Binh Province; recently he was present when a Kampuchean delegation from Siem Riep visited his province. (NHAN DAN 18 Jun 80 p 4)

Nguyễn Văn Tiến [NGUYEENX VAWN TIEENS]

Secretary General of the Vietnam Fatherland Front; \*Vice Chairman of the Central Guidance Committee for Developing the New Life Style; on 27 June 1980 he was appointed to the latter position. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 80 p 1)

Đoàn Tuệ [ZOANX TUEES], Major General

\*Deputy Chief of Staff of the VPA; recently he attended a Ministry of National Defense conference on improving the quality of the Armed Forces. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 20 Jun 80 p 1)

Nguyễn Ngọc Uyên <sup>2</sup> [NGUYEENX NGOCJ UYENR]

SRV Ambassador to Poland; on 12 June 1980 he awarded medals to Polish technicians who had worked at the Cua Ông Coal Sorting Plant, Quang Ninh Province. (NHAN DAN 23 Jun 80 p 4)

Trần Văn <sup>2</sup> [TRAANEF VAAN]

\*Secretary of the VCP Committee, Tu Lec District, Hai Hung Province; he was mentioned in an article on issuing VCP membership cards in his district. (NHAN DAN 18 Jun 80 p 3)

Hoàng Quốc Việt <sup>2</sup> [HOANGF QUOCQS VIEETJ]

Chairman of the Vietnam Fatherland Front; \*Chairman of the Central Guidance Committee for Developing the New Life Style; on 27 June 1980 he was appointed to the latter post. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 80 p 1)

Nguyễn Xiển <sup>2</sup> [NGUYEENX XIEENR]

Secretary General of the Vietnam Socialist Party; on 29 June 1980 he attended a meeting marking the 36th Anniversary of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (NHAN DAN 30 Jun 80 p 1)

Phùng Đức Yên <sup>2</sup> [PHUNGF DAWCS YEENS]

\*Deputy Head of the Propaganda and Training Department, Ministry of War Invalids and Social Welfare; his article "Caring for and Educating the Survivors of War Dead" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 26 Jun 80 p 3)

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[Text] Special Communique of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Communist Party, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (pp 1-2) (already translated)

Biography of President Ton Duc Thang (pp 3-4) (already translated)

Eulogy Read at Funeral of President Ton Duc Thang (pp 5-6) (already translated)

Program of the 90th Anniversary of the Birth of President Ho Chi Minh (pp 7-23)

Some Major Experiences of the Fight Against the Chinese Aggressors and the Military Scientific-Technical Research Task in the Enterprise of Defending the Homeland (pp 24-28)

(Speech by Premier Pham Van Dong [PHAM VAWN DOONG] at the Military Technical Institute) (being translated)

Advance Under the Revolutionary Banner of Leninism (pp 29-42, 50)

(Speech by Le Duc Tho [LEE DUNCS THOJ], member of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee, at a ceremony commemorating the 110th anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin) (already translated)

Promote Military Science Recapitulation and Research to Serve the Present Military Missions (pp 43-50)

(Article by Senior General Hoang Van That [HOANG VAWN THAIS]) (being translated)

The Art of Situational Command (pp 51-61)

(Article by Lieutenant General Hoang Minh Thao / HOANG MINH THAO /  
(being translated)

A Great Strategic Slogan of V.I. Lenin (pp 62-71)

(Article by Trung Thu / TRUNG THU / )

Assuring Communications and Transportation in People's War to Defeat the  
War of Destruction of the U.S. Imperialists (pp 72-79)

(Article by Lieutenant Colonel Tran Lien / TRANH LIEU / and  
Lieutenant Colonel Ha Tin / HAF TIN / )

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Text Strive to Develop Agricultural Science and Technology in Accordance With the Party Line (pp 1, 2)

(Article by Bui Huy Dap, Vice Chairman of the State Scientific and Technology Commission)

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(Article by Tran Viet Chi, Deputy Chief of the Department of Cultivation of the Ministry of Agriculture)

Researching and Applying Science and Technology to Serve the District Echelon (pp 6-8)

(Article by Nguyen Dinh Nam, Chairman of the Agricultural Economics Faculty of the Economics-Planning College)

A Draft Classification of Sciences (continued) (pp 9-14)

(Article by Ta Quang Buu, formerly Minister of Higher and Vocational Education; Dang Ba Lam, of the Higher and Vocational Education Research Institute; and Vu Cong Lap, of the Military Medical College)

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(Article by Tran Huu Nhu, of the Food Industry Institute)

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(Article by Le Van Ninh of the Polytechnic College)

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(Article by Hoang Bao Chau, Director of the Eastern Medicine Research Institute)

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April Issue

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Text Some opinions on Scientific-Technical Activities in 1979 and the Central Tasks for 1980 (pp 1-3)

(Article by Nguyen Tran Duong)

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(Article by Vo Tuyen Hoang)

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(Article by Tong Duy An)

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